The Supreme Court has refused to quash bigamy proceedings against a husband who obtained a divorce decree in the United Kingdom after his attempt to dissolve the marriage in India failed, holding that a foreign decree must satisfy the conditions for recognition under Indian law before it can be relied upon to justify a subsequent marriage.
A Bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Shree Chandrashekhar held that the UK decree, granted on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, could not provide the protection claimed by the husband at the stage of considering a plea to quash criminal proceedings.
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The Court, however, quashed the proceedings against his parents and second wife, finding insufficient material to establish their individual involvement in the alleged offence. It expressly clarified that its conclusions were confined to the limited scrutiny permissible at this stage and did not constitute a final opinion on the merits of the prosecution.
Background: Indian Divorce Proceedings Followed By UK Decree
The dispute arose from a marriage solemnised on April 18, 2003, at Sattenapalli in Andhra Pradesh according to Hindu rites and customs. The couple initially lived in Hyderabad, where the husband was pursuing postgraduate medical studies.
The husband moved to the United Kingdom in February 2005 to pursue his career as a doctor. His wife joined him in May 2006, but returned to her parental home in August 2007 for childbirth. Their son was born in November 2007. According to the husband, she did not return to the United Kingdom despite repeated requests.
As their relationship deteriorated, the husband instituted divorce and custody proceedings before the competent court in Andhra Pradesh. Those proceedings were dismissed. He challenged the dismissal of the divorce petition before the High Court but subsequently withdrew his appeal.
After obtaining British citizenship by naturalisation on February 1, 2013, he instituted fresh divorce proceedings before the Cambridge County Court in England on August 16, 2013. His first wife raised objections to that court’s jurisdiction and competence.
The foreign court directed the issuance of a decree nisi on November 27, 2013. The divorce became absolute on January 29, 2014, on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. The husband subsequently married another woman in Norfolk, United Kingdom, on March 3, 2014.
First Wife Initiates Bigamy Case
On February 1, 2016, the first wife lodged a complaint at Sattenapalli Town Police Station alleging offences under Sections 494 and 120B, read with Section 34, of the Indian Penal Code.
The police filed a chargesheet against the husband and his parents, but deleted the second wife’s name after finding insufficient material against her. At the cognizance stage, the Magistrate nevertheless proceeded against the second wife as well.
All four accused sought quashing of the criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissed their petitions by a common order dated July 8, 2019, prompting their appeals to the Supreme Court.
Foreign Divorce Decrees Require Scrutiny Under Indian Law
The Supreme Court examined Sections 13 and 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which govern the recognition of foreign judgments and the presumption concerning the competence of the foreign court.
The Bench explained that recognition of a foreign matrimonial decree depends on compliance with Section 13, the law governing the marriage, and the relevant jurisdictional principles. A foreign decree does not automatically become binding in India merely because it has been issued by a court abroad.
Relying on Y. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi, the Court reiterated that the jurisdiction assumed by the foreign court and the grounds on which matrimonial relief is granted must ordinarily accord with the law under which the parties married, subject to the recognised exceptions concerning residence, voluntary submission and consent.
The Court also referred to Satya v. Teja Singh to emphasise that principles governing recognition of foreign divorce decrees cannot be separated from the law governing the parties’ matrimonial status.
Irretrievable Breakdown Decree Could Not Provide Claimed Protection
Applying these principles, the Bench noted that the husband had first sought divorce in India, failed to secure relief, and withdrawn his appeal before approaching the foreign court.
The UK decree was founded on irretrievable breakdown of marriage, which the Court noted was not a statutory ground for divorce under the Hindu matrimonial law governing the parties.
The Bench held that the decree failed the legal threshold required for recognition under Section 13 of the CPC and the principles laid down in Y. Narasimha Rao. The husband could not rely on such a decree to assert that his first marriage had been dissolved under Indian matrimonial law and thereby avoid the rigours of Section 494 of the IPC at this stage.
The Court also referred to Kishorekumar Mohan Kale v. Kashmira Kale, in which it had declined to recognise a foreign divorce granted on irretrievable breakdown while separately exercising its constitutional power under Article 142 to dissolve the marriage. That discussion distinguished recognition of a foreign decree from the Supreme Court’s own constitutional power to grant matrimonial relief.
Jurisdictional Objection Does Not Amount To Unconditional Submission
The husband argued that his first wife had participated in the UK proceedings and submitted to the foreign court’s jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court found that the foreign proceedings prima facie did not support this contention. The wife had objected to the foreign court’s jurisdiction.
Her participation could therefore not, at this stage, be equated with unconditional submission to that jurisdiction so as to make the divorce decree binding upon her.
British Citizenship Did Not Justify Quashing Proceedings
The husband further contended that he was a British citizen when the second marriage took place outside India and that Section 4 of the IPC prevented the prosecution from proceeding against him.
The Court rejected the submission in the manner advanced. It reasoned that an inquiry into bigamy could not be confined to the place where the second marriage occurred; it also had to consider the subsisting matrimonial relationship arising from the first marriage solemnised in India under Hindu rites.
The Bench held that the legal consequences of that subsisting marriage could not be defeated by a subsequent change in nationality.
These observations formed part of the Court’s examination of the quashing request, with the merits of the prosecution expressly left open.
Delay In Complaint Did Not Warrant Intervention
The husband also relied on the interval between the second marriage in March 2014 and the complaint in February 2016 to argue that the proceedings were intended to harass him.
The Supreme Court declined to stop the prosecution on this ground at the present stage. It described bigamy as a continuing offence and held that the delay relied upon did not justify quashing the proceedings against him.
Parents Cannot Be Prosecuted Merely Because Of Their Relationship
The Court reached a different conclusion regarding the husband’s parents.
The chargesheet alleged that they had conspired concerning the execution of certain properties in the husband’s favour and thereby encouraged his second marriage. The Bench found these allegations insufficient to establish a conspiracy to commit bigamy.
There was no material showing an agreement to commit that offence or identifying an overt act by the parents towards its commission.
Referring to Sivaraman Nair v. State of Kerala and S. Nitheen v. State of Kerala, the Court emphasised that mere awareness of a second marriage does not establish the criminal involvement required to prosecute relatives. Material showing active participation, facilitation or relevant overt conduct was necessary.
Second Wife’s Criminal Liability Had To Be Examined Separately
The first wife alleged that an inquiry she made in the United Kingdom in 2013 indicated that the husband and second wife had been living together as husband and wife since 2012. According to the complaint, the second wife had described herself as a companion when confronted.
However, the investigating agency found insufficient material against the second wife and removed her name from the chargesheet. The Supreme Court noted that the Magistrate subsequently took cognizance against her without assigning reasons.
The Bench found no other overt act demonstrating that she knowingly participated in the alleged offence or consciously knew that the first marriage continued to subsist. It held that criminal liability had to be established separately for each accused and that continuing the proceedings against her would amount to an abuse of the process of law.
Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court dismissed the husband’s appeal and sustained the criminal proceedings against him for the offence under Section 494 of the IPC.
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