The Supreme Court has held that a grandson cannot claim a share by birth in property that devolved upon his father under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and became the father’s exclusive property following partition among the grandfather’s heirs.

The Bench of Justice Augustine George Masih and Justice Sunita Agarwal upheld the Madras High Court’s decision reversing the trial court’s preliminary decree in favour of the claimant.

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The dispute concerned land measuring 1,811 square feet, originally belonging to the claimant’s grandfather, N. Ramakrishnan.

In 1993, the grandfather’s daughter, G. Lalitha, instituted a suit for partition and separate possession of his properties. A compromise dated February 3, 1994 resulted in the claimant’s father receiving the disputed property as his share.

The claimant was born on January 6, 1994, after the earlier partition suit had been instituted but before the compromise was reached. Relying on this sequence, he argued that he had acquired a coparcenary interest by birth before the property was allotted to his father.

In 1997, a partition suit was filed on his behalf through his mother and natural guardian. He sought partition and possession of a half share, asserting that the property was ancestral or joint family property in which he held an independent interest.

The father had executed two sale deeds, dated April 3, 1997 and April 17, 1997, in favour of the other defendants. The purchasers contested the suit, maintaining that the father was the absolute owner under the earlier compromise decree and was entitled to sell the property.

The II Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai granted a preliminary decree for partition. The purchasers challenged that decree before the High Court.

The High Court held that the father had become the absolute owner of the property received upon succession and partition. It concluded that the claimant did not acquire a right by birth in that property and could not seek its partition on that basis.

The claimant subsequently approached the Supreme Court, seeking restoration of the trial court’s decree.

Before the Supreme Court, the claimant argued that allotment of the property to his father did not destroy its ancestral character as between the father and his son.

He emphasised that he had been born before the February 1994 compromise and had not been made a party to the earlier partition proceedings. According to him, his father’s separation from other family branches did not extinguish the coparcenary interest he had acquired by birth.

The claimant also relied on Section 29-A, introduced by the Tamil Nadu amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, and decisions recognising birthrights in ancestral coparcenary property.

He contended that his father could not transfer the entire property without determining his son’s share, and that the purchasers could not acquire a better title than their vendor possessed.

The respondents maintained that the dispute was governed by Section 8, which regulates succession to the property of a Hindu male dying intestate. They argued that the father inherited in his individual capacity and that the grandson had no independent birthright in the property.

The Supreme Court examined the statutory succession scheme and reiterated the distinction between property devolving under Section 8 and an interest in subsisting coparcenary property.

The Bench explained that Class I heirs inherit simultaneously to the exclusion of other heirs under the statutory scheme. A son’s son whose father is alive is not independently included as a Class I heir to the grandfather. The Schedule does, however, recognise the son of a predeceased son.

Applying the principle recognised in Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Chander Sen, the Court held that a son inheriting under Section 8 does so in his individual capacity, rather than as the karta of an undivided family comprising himself and his children.

Treating such inheritance as HUF property in the hands of male heirs would create a distinction between male and female Class I heirs that the statutory scheme does not contemplate.

“The express words of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 cannot be ignored and must prevail.”

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court found that the grandfather’s property had devolved upon his Class I heirs. Those heirs succeeded as tenants in common, rather than joint tenants.

The settlement and compromise decree divided their shares, making each heir the exclusive owner of the property allotted to him or her. The claimant’s father consequently became the exclusive owner of the disputed property in his individual capacity.

The Court held that this property did not constitute HUF property of the father’s branch merely because the claimant was his son. His birth did not create a fresh coparcenary interest in property that had devolved under Section 8.

The Bench also addressed the claimant’s argument that he had been born before the compromise decree.

Although the grandfather’s exact date of death was not disclosed, the Court noted that succession had evidently opened before the claimant’s birth. The partition suit concerning the grandfather’s estate had already been filed in 1993, whereas the claimant was born in January 1994.

The subsequent compromise did not alter that sequence. The claimant could not establish a coparcenary right merely because he was born before the settlement recording the division of the heirs’ shares.

In the circumstances, the Court held that neither the unamended Section 6 nor Section 29-A introduced by the Tamil Nadu amendment assisted his claim.

The Supreme Court further noted that the claimant had not challenged either the earlier compromise decree or the two sale deeds executed by his father.

The relief sought in the 1997 suit was confined to partition and possession of a half share on the premise of a coparcenary right by birth.

The father was alive when the partition suit was instituted. The judgment also records the claimant’s submission that his father subsequently died in 2024.

The Bench found no basis to recognise the asserted birthright in the father’s exclusive property and no infirmity in the High Court’s judgment.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, with no order as to costs, and disposed of all pending applications.

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