The Supreme Court has ruled that offences under the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) cannot be independently investigated by the police merely because the statute classifies them as cognizable and non-bailable.

 The bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh has observed that the Appropriate Authority (AA) is the principal investigating authority under the Act, while police involvement can only be supplemental and at the request or under the supervision of the Appropriate Authority.

The proceedings originated from allegations of illegal sex determination of a foetus in Bulandshahar, Uttar Pradesh. According to the judgment, the District Magistrate, who was the Appropriate Authority under the PCPNDT Act, received secret information regarding alleged illegal sex determination being carried out by the accused and others. A Tehsildar was deputed as an authorised officer to conduct a decoy operation, following which a raid was conducted at a hospital.

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An FIR was subsequently registered and a chargesheet was filed invoking Sections 315 and 511 of the IPC along with Sections 4, 5(2), 6(a), 23 and 25 of the PCPNDT Act. The accused approached the Allahabad High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking quashing of the proceedings.

The legal controversy arose because different High Courts had taken divergent views on whether the police could register an FIR and independently investigate PCPNDT Act offences, and whether a Magistrate could take cognizance of such offences on the basis of a police chargesheet. The Allahabad High Court consequently framed questions of law for consideration by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court was called upon to determine three principal issues.

First, whether registration of an FIR by the police for a PCPNDT Act offence was permissible merely because Section 27 declares the offences under the Act to be cognizable and non-bailable.

Second, whether the police could investigate PCPNDT Act offences and, if not, who was competent to conduct such investigation.

Third, whether a competent Magistrate could take cognizance of a PCPNDT Act offence on the basis of a chargesheet submitted after a police investigation.

A significant part of the judgment concerns the apparent tension between Section 27, which declares every PCPNDT offence to be cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable, and Section 28, which restricts the manner in which a court can take cognizance of an offence under the Act.

The Court rejected an interpretation under which the single expression “cognizable” in Section 27 would automatically confer unrestricted investigative jurisdiction on the police. It held that Sections 27 and 28 must be read together with the other provisions of the special legislation, particularly Sections 17, 17A and 30 and Rule 18A.

The Court emphasised that the PCPNDT Act is a specialised legislation involving medical and technical issues and was enacted as a socially beneficial measure to prevent misuse of pre-natal diagnostic techniques for sex determination and the resulting practice of female foeticide.

The Supreme Court held that Section 17(4) specifically entrusts the Appropriate Authority with the responsibility of investigating complaints concerning violations of the Act. The Authority is also equipped under Section 17A with powers to summon persons, require production of documents and material and issue search warrants in appropriate cases.

The Court therefore concluded that the police cannot be the main investigating authority for PCPNDT Act offences. Rule 18A(3)(iv) of the PCPNDT Rules, which states that the police should, “as far as possible,” not be involved in investigating such cases, was held to have statutory force. Police participation can therefore take place only in a supplemental capacity when required by the Appropriate Authority and under its supervision.

The judgment thus gives substantive meaning to the specialised investigative structure created under the Act instead of treating the Appropriate Authority merely as an entity required to file a complaint after an investigation independently conducted by the police.

The Court’s answer to the first question was categorical: police are not intended to be investigators for offences under the PCPNDT Act merely because those offences are cognizable and non-bailable.

The Court explained that even where an FIR is registered, it cannot be taken to its logical conclusion under the procedural mechanism applicable to an ordinary police case under the PCPNDT Act. Importantly, this restriction is confined to offences under the PCPNDT Act itself and does not prevent the police from investigating separate offences under the IPC, BNS or another general penal statute that may emerge from the same facts.

The Supreme Court also settled the position regarding cognizance.

Section 28 creates a statutory restriction on the court’s power to take cognizance of a PCPNDT Act offence. Cognizance can be taken only through the mechanisms prescribed by that provision, including a complaint by the Appropriate Authority or an authorised person in accordance with the statutory requirements.

Consequently, the Court held that a Magistrate cannot take cognizance of a PCPNDT Act offence merely on the basis of a police chargesheet. The Court described Section 28 as creating a complete statutory embargo except in the situations contemplated by the provision.

This distinction is important because the judgment separates the concepts of investigation and cognizance. Even where police action is permissible concerning an independent general penal offence arising from the same transaction, the PCPNDT component must follow the special statutory route.

The Court recognised that such circumstances may generate two parallel procedural tracks. The Appropriate Authority remains responsible for investigating the PCPNDT component, while the police may independently investigate a distinct IPC/BNS offence falling within their ordinary jurisdiction. The existence of common facts, persons, premises or records does not by itself transfer jurisdiction over the PCPNDT component to the police.

Thus, if information received at a police station discloses only a PCPNDT Act violation, the police must make an appropriate station or diary entry and transmit the information and material to the notified Appropriate Authority without avoidable delay. The police must not commence an independent investigation into the PCPNDT offence.

Where the same information also discloses an independently constituted cognizable offence under the IPC/BNS or another general penal law, the police may investigate that separate offence, but must not investigate the PCPNDT component. The latter must simultaneously be referred to the Appropriate Authority.

The concurring judgment makes clear that the Supreme Court has not completely excluded the police from matters connected with PCPNDT Act cases.

The Appropriate Authority may seek police assistance for purposes such as protection, tracing an accused, preservation of a scene, digital or forensic support and other ancillary requirements. However, such assistance remains subordinate to the investigation led by the Appropriate Authority.

The police cannot convert such assistance into an independent investigation of the PCPNDT offence or ultimately file a police chargesheet concerning that offence. The Appropriate Authority also cannot abdicate its statutory responsibility by effectively handing over the investigation to the police.

The Court laid down a clear rule for overlapping investigations: neither agency can assume jurisdiction merely because another offence arises from the same transaction.

If police investigating an independent IPC/BNS offence discover material suggesting a PCPNDT violation, they must promptly place the material before the Appropriate Authority. Conversely, if the Appropriate Authority discovers an independent IPC/BNS offence during its PCPNDT investigation, it must communicate the relevant information to the jurisdictional police without taking over the general criminal investigation.

The Court stressed that the specialised composition and statutory powers of the Appropriate Authority make it better suited to determine whether particular conduct falls within the PCPNDT Act.

The Court held that the police are not meant to investigate PCPNDT Act offences merely because Section 27 makes them cognizable and non-bailable. The statutory scheme, read as a whole, places the investigation with the specialised mechanism under the Act. This restriction does not affect police powers concerning independent offences under general criminal law.

The Court held that the Appropriate Authority is responsible for investigating complaints under the PCPNDT Act. The police cannot be the main investigating agency and may play only a supplemental role when required by the Appropriate Authority and under its supervision.

The Court held that Section 28 creates a statutory embargo on cognizance except through the mechanisms prescribed by the Act. Therefore, a competent Magistrate cannot take cognizance of a PCPNDT Act offence on the basis of a police chargesheet.

The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the High Court for a decision in accordance with its judgment. The appeal was accordingly disposed of along with pending applications, if any.

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