The Supreme Court has ruled that compensation claims arising from electrocution cannot ordinarily be adjudicated through a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution when the case involves disputed questions of fact.
At the same time, the bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh clarified that electricity authorities and statutory bodies are subject to the doctrine of strict liability for harm caused by the inherently dangerous activity of transmitting electricity, subject to recognised exceptions.
The principal appeal concerned the death of N. Subramanya, husband of respondent Rekha, who died following an electrocution incident on February 22, 2018. An FIR was registered on the same day. Rekha subsequently approached the Karnataka High Court seeking compensation.
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KPTC opposed the writ proceedings, raising objections including maintainability, absence of negligence on its part and the existence of disputed questions of fact. Despite these objections, the Single Judge and subsequently the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court entertained the writ proceedings and held KPTC liable to pay compensation.
The High Court adopted the framework of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for determining compensation and awarded ₹25,52,500 with interest at 6%, payable after three months from the date of judgment.
A connected appeal involved Muizz Ahmad Shariff, who suffered severe injuries after jumping onto the roof of a neighbouring building to retrieve a cricket ball and coming into contact with a 66 KV electricity line. The Karnataka High Court had awarded ₹44,32,050, which was also upheld by the Division Bench.
The Supreme Court therefore considered two principal questions: whether such writ petitions are maintainable and what yardstick should govern compensation in electrocution cases.
The Supreme Court reiterated that although Article 226 confers wide powers upon High Courts, the writ jurisdiction is discretionary. Ordinarily, where an efficacious alternative remedy exists, a writ petition should not be entertained.
The Court referred to the principles laid down in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P., under which exceptions to the alternative-remedy rule may arise in situations involving violation of fundamental rights or natural justice, proceedings wholly without jurisdiction, or a challenge to the vires of legislation. The existence of disputed questions of fact is also a relevant consideration in determining whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised.
The Bench also relied upon the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. v. Sukamani Das, which specifically dealt with electrocution claims.
In that case, the Court had cautioned that merely because a person died after coming into contact with an electricity transmission line, negligence could not automatically be presumed. Questions concerning the condition of the line, the circumstances in which the accident occurred and possible intervention by third parties could require factual examination and could not necessarily be resolved merely on affidavits in a writ proceeding.
The Supreme Court found that the present proceedings involved several factual controversies which required adjudication.
In the appeal concerning Subramanya’s death, the disputed issues included whether the use of an aluminium ladder in a coffee plantation, which came into contact with an 11 KV electricity line, constituted negligence; whether the plantation owner was negligent in providing the ladder; whether backup relays were actually functioning satisfactorily; and whether KPTC was responsible for maintenance of the relevant portion of the electricity line.
In the connected appeal involving Shariff’s injuries, questions arose regarding whether the statutory minimum distance between the building and the electricity line had been maintained, whether an undertaking given by the building owner shifted liability, and whether KPTC could be held negligent merely because it had provided an electricity connection to the building.
The Supreme Court held that these were not merely theoretical disputes. They were questions requiring evidence and factual determination.
The Karnataka High Court had proceeded on the basis that the doctrine of absolute liability applied and that, since absolute liability admits of no exceptions, disputed facts would not absolve KPTC.
The Supreme Court disagreed with this approach and undertook a detailed examination of the distinction between absolute liability and strict liability.
The Court explained that absolute liability, as developed in the M.C. Mehta v. Union of India Oleum Gas Leak case, applies to enterprises engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activities. Such an enterprise owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to ensure that its activity does not cause harm, and it cannot defend itself merely by asserting that reasonable care had been taken.
However, the Supreme Court held that the appropriate standard in electrocution cases involving electricity authorities is strict liability, rather than absolute liability.
The Court emphasised that transmission of electricity is inherently dangerous. Entities responsible for such activities are therefore expected to bear the risk associated with them.
Referring to earlier precedents, the Court noted that strict liability focuses on the nature of the dangerous activity rather than simply on whether negligence has been established. The doctrine reflects the principle that those who undertake hazardous activities are generally best placed to bear and distribute the resulting risks.
The Bench particularly relied on M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari, where the Supreme Court had held that the supplier of electricity has a primary responsibility to compensate a person injured or killed by dangerous electrical energy, and that electricity authorities have an enhanced duty to adopt safety measures to prevent accidents.
The Supreme Court made it clear that the fact that an electricity undertaking is a statutory or public authority does not, by itself, shield it from strict liability.
The Court observed that public utility undertakings are also capable of being subjected to the doctrine because strict liability is not based upon moral fault. Instead, it concerns the allocation of risks arising from inherently dangerous activities.
Accordingly, electricity authorities may be required to compensate victims even in cases where fault or negligence has not been established, provided none of the recognised exceptions to strict liability applies.
The Court also stressed that strict liability is not synonymous with absolute liability.
The judgment referred to recognised exceptions, including consent of the claimant, common benefit, an unforeseeable act of a stranger, exercise of statutory authority, act of God, default of the claimant and remoteness of consequences.
Thus, although electricity authorities carry a substantial responsibility because of the hazardous nature of electricity transmission, liability must still be assessed in light of the circumstances and applicable exceptions.
The Supreme Court also rejected the methodology adopted by the Karnataka High Court for quantifying compensation.
The High Court had adopted the multiplier-based framework under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. However, the Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision in Raman v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd., which held that the multiplier method applicable under the Motor Vehicles Act cannot simply be transplanted into electrocution cases.
The Bench noted that while Section 57 of the Electricity Act, 2003 contemplates compensation liability in specified circumstances, the statute does not prescribe a detailed methodology for calculating compensation.
Consequently, the governing principle should be the award of just, reasonable and fair compensation, taking into account the income of the deceased or injured person and other relevant claims.
Having found that disputed questions of fact were involved, the Supreme Court concluded that the writ petitions seeking compensation were not maintainable.
The Court therefore quashed and set aside the judgments of both the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court. However, the Supreme Court clarified that this would not deprive the victims or their families of an alternative legal remedy.
The respondents were expressly permitted to pursue appropriate proceedings before the competent forum. Such proceedings are to be decided independently and expeditiously, without being influenced by observations contained in the Supreme Court judgment.
During the pendency of the Supreme Court proceedings, the Court had ordered payment of ₹5 lakh as interim compensation on December 18, 2025.
Although the High Court judgments have now been set aside, the Supreme Court directed that the interim amount already paid shall not be recovered from the respondents.
The Court further clarified that the amount would not prejudice or reduce any compensation that may ultimately be awarded in appropriate proceedings.
The same approach was extended to the respondents in the connected appeal involving the 66 KV line incident. Both appeals were ultimately allowed, with the parties directed to bear their own costs.
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