The Supreme Court has held that a murder conviction can be sustained solely on the testimony of a single eyewitness if the evidence is natural, cogent, credible and trustworthy, reiterating that criminal courts are required to assess the quality rather than the quantity of evidence.
The bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria clarified that the mere fact that an eyewitness is related to the deceased does not make the witness an “interested witness” or render the testimony unreliable.
The prosecution case arose from an incident in February 1998 in Sundargarh district of Odisha. According to the prosecution, following the death of the youngest daughter of Manobodha Naik, members of the family attributed the death to alleged witchcraft practised by the deceased woman, Puni Naik.
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The appellant and co-accused Udai Oram allegedly went to Puni Naik’s house, dragged her out and assaulted her near the house of Manobodha Naik. The prosecution relied principally on the testimony of P.W.3, the daughter of the deceased, who claimed to have witnessed the assault. Puni Naik subsequently died from the injuries.
The prosecution examined nine witnesses before the Trial Court. No defence witness was examined. Relying principally on the eyewitness testimony of P.W.3, the Trial Court convicted the appellant and the co-accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and imposed life imprisonment. The High Court subsequently affirmed the conviction, finding that the injuries inflicted on vital parts of the deceased’s body were corroborated by medical evidence.
The appellant argued that P.W.3 was the daughter of the deceased and therefore an interested witness. It was contended that, in the absence of corroboration from an independent eyewitness, her evidence should not be sufficient to sustain a murder conviction.
The appellant also sought alteration of the conviction from murder under Section 302 IPC to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I or Part II IPC, contending that the incident occurred because of grave and sudden provocation and that the requisite intention to commit murder was absent.
The defence additionally relied upon the alleged delay in lodging the FIR and pointed to certain inconsistencies in P.W.3’s evidence concerning the time of death and the weapons allegedly used.
The State, however, maintained that a witness cannot be discarded merely because the witness is related to the deceased. It argued that P.W.3’s testimony was corroborated by medical evidence and that there is no requirement in law that a conviction must be based on multiple eyewitnesses.
At the outset, the Supreme Court noted that the appellant was seeking interference with concurrent factual findings recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court.
Referring to its earlier decisions concerning the scope of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, the Court reiterated that although its powers are wide, it ordinarily does not interfere with concurrent findings of fact in criminal appeals except in exceptional circumstances.
The Court identified circumstances in which interference may nevertheless be justified, including where the High Court has acted perversely or improperly, where the prosecution evidence falls short of the threshold of reliability, or where the appreciation of evidence suffers from an error of law or procedure, misreading of evidence, violation of natural justice, or conclusions that are manifestly perverse and unsupported by the record.
The Bench therefore proceeded to examine whether the case disclosed any exceptional circumstance warranting interference with the concurrent findings.
A significant part of the judgment concerns the legal position regarding conviction based upon the testimony of a sole eyewitness.
The Court observed that P.W.3 had remained substantially unshaken regarding the central allegation that the appellant and the co-accused assaulted her mother, resulting in her death. The Court found her presence at the scene natural and her account of the assault sufficiently consistent and credible.
Reiterating established principles of criminal jurisprudence, the Bench held that direct ocular evidence, when natural, cogent and trustworthy, is ordinarily the best form of evidence.
The Court relied on Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras to emphasise that there is no legal requirement for a particular number of witnesses to prove a fact. A conviction can legally rest on the testimony of a single witness where that testimony is found to be wholly reliable. The governing principle is that “evidence has to be weighed and not counted.”
The Court further relied on Prithipal Singh v. State of Punjab, reiterating that the decisive consideration is not the number of witnesses but whether the evidence carries a ring of truth and is cogent, credible and trustworthy. Thus, a court may convict on the testimony of one witness, while it may also acquit despite several witnesses if their evidence lacks reliability.
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that P.W.3’s relationship with the deceased rendered her testimony inherently suspect.
The Court referred to its earlier decision in Shio Shankar Dubey v. State of Bihar and other precedents to explain that a witness is not to be treated as an “interested witness” merely because the witness is related to the deceased.
According to the Court, a witness becomes an interested witness when there is a demonstrated direct motive, personal animosity or other reason to falsely implicate the accused. A close relative who happens to be a natural witness to an occurrence cannot automatically be disbelieved merely because of the relationship.
Referring to Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar and earlier authorities, the Court reiterated that a close relative who is a natural witness cannot be equated with an interested witness unless there is material indicating an actual motive to falsely implicate the accused.
Applying these principles, the Court concluded that P.W.3’s relationship with the deceased did not make her evidence unreliable. Her direct testimony was also found to be corroborated by the medical evidence.
The appellant had also sought conversion of the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 IPC by invoking the argument of sudden provocation.
The Supreme Court examined the post-mortem evidence, which recorded multiple ante-mortem injuries, including injuries to the head, neck, chest, abdomen and other parts of the body. The medical evidence also recorded blood clots beneath injuries to the skull and changes in the brain consistent with serious head trauma.
The Court referred to Pulicherla Nagaraju alias Nagaraja Reddy v. State of A.P., which explains that the distinction between murder under Section 302 and culpable homicide under Section 304 depends substantially upon the intention of the accused, to be assessed from the totality of circumstances.
Relevant considerations include the nature of the weapon, the part of the body targeted, the force employed, whether the incident occurred during a sudden quarrel, whether there was premeditation, whether there was grave and sudden provocation, whether undue advantage was taken and whether the accused inflicted a single blow or several blows.
In the present case, the Court found that the injuries, particularly the grievous injuries inflicted on the head, neck, chest and other vital parts of the body, demonstrated a clear intention to cause death. It also found no material establishing that any exception to Section 300 IPC was attracted.
The plea to convert the conviction to Section 304 Part I or Part II IPC was therefore rejected.
The appellant further relied upon the delay in lodging the FIR.
The Supreme Court reiterated that delay in lodging an FIR is a relevant circumstance, but it does not automatically render the prosecution case unreliable. The effect of the delay has to be assessed in the context of the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
The Court relied upon Om Pal v. State of U.P. and Ramdas v. State of Maharashtra to reiterate that courts must examine whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained and whether it affects the overall credibility of the prosecution case. Factors such as the circumstances surrounding the incident, distance from the police station, availability of transportation, fear or threats and the condition of the witnesses may be relevant.
In the present case, the Court noted that P.W.3 was only around 15–16 years old at the time of the incident. Having witnessed the assault and death of her mother, she would naturally have been in a state of shock and despair.
The Court found it understandable that she did not immediately go to the police station during the night and that she was able to approach the police only after her maternal uncle came to the house and accompanied her. The delay was therefore held to be satisfactorily explained.
Beyond the evidentiary questions, the judgment contains strong observations on the continuing practice of witch-hunting.
The Court expressly titled this portion of its judgment “Witch-Hunting: An Anathema to Human Dignity.” It observed that the case deeply disturbed its conscience because a defenseless woman had been branded as a practitioner of witchcraft, ultimately leading to her brutal killing.
The Bench observed that witch-hunting continues to affect sections of society where prejudice, superstition and irrational fear can override the rule of law and constitutional morality. The Court noted that victims, predominantly women, may face not only physical violence but also social ostracisation and collective hostility.
The judgment further observed that blaming women for acts they did not commit can become an easy escape in difficult circumstances and reflects deeply rooted social prejudice. The Court emphasised the importance of reason as a safeguard against collective irrationality.
The Bench also stressed that the Constitution envisages a society founded upon equality, fraternity and scientific temperament, and that practices derogatory to women must have no place in a constitutional democracy.
The Supreme Court held that the direct evidence against the appellant was compelling and established that the deceased had been murdered following the allegation that she had caused the death of another woman’s daughter through witchcraft.
The Court held that both the Trial Court and the High Court had correctly assessed the appellant’s culpability. It accordingly affirmed the conviction and life sentence and dismissed the appeal.
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