The Supreme Court has acquitted a man sentenced to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, holding that the statutory presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 cannot be used to mechanically accept the prosecution’s version when the evidence contains material contradictions and lacks medical or forensic support.
The bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria said that the presumptions concerning commission of an offence and culpable mental state under the POCSO Act are rebuttable and operate only as rules shifting the evidential burden. They do not relieve a court of its duty to objectively assess the entire evidence, nor do they permit the prosecution’s case to be treated as “gospel truth”.
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“The presumptive provisions do not operate to oust the evidence standing in favour of the accused,” the Court observed, explaining that a presumption which operates at the initial stage may disappear by the conclusion of trial if the accused successfully exposes contradictions, gaps, improbabilities or a mismatch between oral, medical and forensic evidence.
The case arose from allegations concerning a two-and-a-half-year-old child in Delhi. According to the complaint lodged by the child’s mother, the child went to the appellant’s adjoining jhuggi while playing on December 9, 2015. When she did not return, the mother learnt that the appellant had taken her to Hans Raj City Park.
The mother alleged that after the child was brought home, she cried and had difficulty urinating. She further claimed to have noticed blood on the child’s pyjami and stated that the child attributed a sexual act to the appellant. The FIR was registered at Kalkaji Police Station on December 11, 2015.
The trial court convicted the appellant under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code for kidnapping and Section 6 of the POCSO Act for aggravated penetrative sexual assault. It sentenced him to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹5,000 under the POCSO Act, and one year’s rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹3,000 under Section 363 IPC. Out of the total fine, ₹7,000 was directed to be paid to the victim as compensation. He was acquitted of the charge under Section 506 IPC.
The Delhi High Court affirmed the conviction. It treated the testimony of the child’s mother as corroborated by a private doctor and the child’s uncle, and held that the contradictions pointed out by the defence were peripheral. Referring to Section 29 of the POCSO Act, the High Court held that a legal presumption of guilt arose and the burden shifted to the accused to rebut it.
Reassessing the evidence, the Supreme Court found serious inconsistencies between the testimony of the child’s mother and that of the private doctor whom the family claimed to have first consulted.
The mother stated that she had taken the child to the doctor at about 9.30 pm along with her husband. The doctor, however, said that the mother and child came to him at about 4 or 5 pm and that the husband was not present. The Court held that this variation could not be dismissed as minor, particularly when considered with the remaining evidence.
The Court also noted that the mother’s deposition contained improvements over her earlier accounts. Certain facts narrated during trial, including the alleged explanation given by the appellant for taking the child to the park, did not appear in the FIR. The Court found that the evidence of the private doctor also lacked reliability: he prepared no treatment record, claimed that the child had not been brought for treatment, and said that he had informed the police by telephone, though none of the police witnesses confirmed receiving such a call.
The judgment reiterated that a conviction may rest on the testimony of a sole witness, but such testimony must be of “sterling quality” when it lacks independent corroboration. The witness’s version must remain natural, consistent and capable of withstanding cross-examination without creating doubt about the occurrence, the persons involved or the sequence of events.
On the facts, the Bench held that the mother’s testimony could not be treated as that of a sterling witness because of omissions, material improvements and contradictions with other evidence.
The medical and forensic material proved decisive. The doctor who physically examined the child found no injury or bloodstain over the vulval area and recorded that the hymen was intact, without any abnormality. Another AIIMS doctor confirmed that the physical examination revealed nothing abnormal or unusual.
The forensic expert testified that no semen was detected on any of the seven exhibits sent to the laboratory, no male DNA could be isolated and no blood was detected on the child’s pyjami. This directly contradicted the assertion of the mother and the private doctor that bloodspots had been seen on the garment.
The Supreme Court acknowledged the settled position that absence of injury or semen does not, by itself, disprove sexual assault. However, it said the present case stood on a different footing because the medical evidence and FSL report, when read together with the contradictions in the oral testimony, ruled out the prosecution’s allegation of a penetrative act and undermined the very theory of sexual assault.
The Court also disagreed with the High Court’s suggestion that the absence of blood on the pyjami could be explained by the possibility that the garment had been washed. It found no evidentiary basis sufficient to overcome the forensic findings.
The Bench gave a detailed explanation of the operation of Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act. Section 29 requires a special court to presume commission, abetment or attempt in prosecutions involving specified POCSO offences unless the contrary is proved. Section 30 permits a presumption of culpable mental state, while allowing the accused to establish the absence of such a mental state.
The Court said these provisions depart from the ordinary criminal-law rule that a person is presumed innocent until proved guilty, but the departure is limited. The prosecution must first establish the basic and foundational facts constituting the alleged offence. Only then does the evidential burden shift to the accused.
The statutory presumption is not absolute, the Court stressed. An accused may rebut it by discrediting prosecution witnesses in cross-examination, demonstrating inherent contradictions, exposing missing links or improbabilities, pointing to absence of proof, showing inconsistency between oral and medical evidence, relying on lack of corroboration, or presenting an available factual or statutory defence.
The Bench cautioned that a court cannot mechanically approve every prosecution simply because the statute contains a reverse-burden provision. At the end of the trial, the accused cannot be placed at an unfair disadvantage merely because a statutory presumption exists.
According to the Court, the reverse burden is an additional prosecutorial aid, not a substitute for credible proof. Once “evidential emptiness” or lack of credibility is found in the prosecution case, the presumption of guilt ceases to be effective. Courts must continue to apply the normal standards governing appreciation of criminal evidence, particularly because the personal liberty of the accused is at stake.
The appellant had argued that the complaint arose from previous enmity between neighbouring families over a common water connection. During cross-examination, the child’s mother admitted that four houses shared the connection, that water was not continuously available and that residents stored water in containers.
The Court found that the existence of disputes over water sharing emerged from the evidence. Against an already inconsistent prosecution version and non-supportive medical evidence, the defence theory acquired sufficient probability and evidentiary value to further weaken the prosecution case.
The Supreme Court concluded that the appellant had successfully rebutted the prosecution case. Even if Sections 29 and 30 initially raised presumptions against him, the prosecution evidence disclosed inconsistencies, improbabilities and material contradictions, while the medical evidence failed to corroborate the alleged offence.
Holding that the prosecution had not proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court set aside the conviction under Section 363 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. It acquitted the appellant and directed that he be released forthwith unless wanted in another case.
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