The Supreme Court has held that an intra-court appeal against an order passed in civil contempt proceedings cannot be ruled out merely by describing contempt jurisdiction as criminal or quasi-criminal.
A Bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu has emphasised that the availability of an appeal depends on the jurisdiction actually exercised and the nature of the order, particularly where a contempt court enters into the merits of the underlying dispute or affects substantive rights.
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The Bench also questioned the correctness of the three-judge decision in Ram Kishan Fauji v. State of Haryana, (2017) 5 SCC 533, concerning restrictions on intra-court appeals in writ matters arising from criminal disputes. It directed that the issue be placed before the Chief Justice of India for appropriate administrative orders for consideration by an appropriate Bench.
The proceedings originated in a recruitment dispute concerning the posts of Assistant Prosecution Officer in Uttar Pradesh.
According to the appellant’s submissions, the writ court, by its order dated March 17, 2026, had quashed an Office Memorandum dated July 28, 2020, and a consequential communication dated August 14, 2020, while directing consideration of the respondents’ candidature.
The appellant maintained that this direction had been complied with through an order dated September 2, 2026, rejecting their candidature. A compliance affidavit containing that decision was filed before the contempt court.
However, the Single Judge rejected the compliance affidavit on September 3, 2026. Reading the writ orders dated March 17, 2026, and December 13, 2019, together, the Single Judge concluded that the State was obliged to appoint the applicants to the posts.
The Single Judge further directed that, unless compliance was secured, the Additional Chief Secretary concerned should appear personally for further proceedings, including the framing of charges.
Additional Solicitor General Nataraj, appearing for the appellant, argued that a contempt court could not judicially review the correctness of an administrative order passed in purported compliance with a writ direction.
Relying on J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar and Lalith Mathur v. L. Maheswara Rao, he submitted that an allegedly incorrect compliance decision should be challenged in fresh substantive proceedings. Its perceived incorrectness would not, by itself, establish wilful disobedience.
He also contended that neither an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, nor a Special Appeal under the Allahabad High Court Rules was available. On that basis, he maintained that approaching the Supreme Court under Article 136 was the available remedy.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the submission that a Special Appeal was unavailable. It expressly left the substantive challenge to the Single Judge’s order undecided.
The Bench explained that the High Court’s contempt power flows from Article 215 of the Constitution and constitutes a distinct, or sui generis, jurisdiction. Civil contempt proceedings are generally in the nature of a special civil jurisdiction.
The possibility of imprisonment or a fine does not automatically convert civil contempt proceedings into ordinary criminal proceedings, the Court observed.
Drawing on Midnapore Peoples’ Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda, the Bench reiterated the distinction between an order punishing a person for contempt and an order deciding substantive issues between the parties.
An appeal under Section 19 ordinarily lies against an order imposing punishment for contempt. Where a Single Judge instead decides the merits of the underlying dispute or issues directions affecting substantive rights, an intra-court appeal may be available, subject to the governing provisions of the High Court.
The Bench stressed that labels cannot determine the issue. The relevant inquiry is what jurisdiction the court actually exercised while passing the challenged order.
This does not make every procedural or interlocutory order in contempt proceedings appealable. The judgment reiterated the distinction between orders affecting valuable rights and routine directions facilitating the progress of a case.
The Bench’s broader concerns related to Ram Kishan Fauji, which addressed the exclusion of intra-court appeals where writ proceedings involve criminal jurisdiction.
The judges expressed doubt about treating Article 226 as containing separate civil and criminal jurisdictions merely according to the subject matter of a petition.
In their view, Article 226 confers a special and extraordinary constitutional writ jurisdiction. A dispute’s origin in a criminal complaint, arrest, FIR or chargesheet does not, by itself, necessarily transform the exercise of constitutional writ power into ordinary criminal jurisdiction.
The Bench also observed that classifying writ petitions as “civil” or “criminal” for listing and roster purposes cannot create a substantive division in the constitutional jurisdiction conferred by Article 226.
It cautioned against reading an appellate exclusion into the governing Letters Patent where its text does not provide one.
The Court highlighted the practical consequences of compelling litigants to approach the Supreme Court when an intra-court appellate remedy is denied.
Travel, accommodation and representation costs may restrict access to justice, the Bench observed. It also noted that jurisdiction under Article 136 is discretionary and ordinarily exercised in special circumstances.
Referring to the Constitution Bench decision in Anita Kushwaha v. Pushap Sudan, the judges emphasised that access to justice forms part of Articles 14 and 21.
The Bench further observed that a right of appeal is a substantive and valuable right. Where the provision conferring that right permits two interpretations, courts should favour the construction that sustains the remedy.
Recognising that Ram Kishan Fauji was decided by a three-judge Bench, the Court referred questions concerning its correctness for consideration by an appropriate Bench. The earlier ruling was not overruled by this order.
Disposing of the appeal, the Supreme Court permitted the appellant to present a Special Appeal before the Allahabad High Court within a fortnight from the order dated October 14, 2026, if so advised.
The appellate Bench was left to examine the challenge on its own merits and in accordance with law, including whether the Single Judge had exceeded the permissible limits of contempt jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court stayed the contempt petition before the Single Judge for two months. The broader reference concerning Ram Kishan Fauji will remain pending.
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