The Supreme Court has held that personal presentation of an election petition by the person challenging an election is a mandatory requirement under Section 81(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Failure to comply with this requirement renders the petition liable to dismissal at the threshold under Section 86(1), the Court ruled.

A bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Shree Chandrashekhar dismissed a special leave petition challenging the Madras High Court’s decision to reject an election petition on the ground that it had been presented by counsel. The judgment, delivered on October 7, 2026, explained that the statutory requirement is directly connected to the maintainability of an election challenge and cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality. 

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The proceedings arose from an election petition filed by V. Pon. Paneerselvam challenging the election of S. Regupathy from the Thirumayam Assembly Constituency in the 2026 Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly elections. The result was declared on May 4, 2026.

The election petitioner sought a declaration that the election was null and void under Sections 100(1)(b) and 100(1)(d)(i) and (iv) of the Representation of the People Act. He also alleged that the returned candidate had committed the corrupt practice of undue influence under Section 123(2), citing alleged suppression and false declarations concerning his spouse’s assets and income in the statutory Form 26 affidavit.

These were allegations raised in the election petition. The Supreme Court’s decision concerned the manner of presentation of the petition, rather than the merits of those allegations.

On July 22, 2026, the Madras High Court dismissed the election petition as not maintainable because it had been presented by the petitioner’s counsel. The High Court relied on Rule 7 of the Madras High Court Election Petitions Rules, 1967, which requires personal presentation before the designated Registry officer.

Examining Section 81(1), the Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision in G.V. Sreerama Reddy and Another v. Returning Officer and Others, which identified five essential requirements governing the presentation of an election petition.

The petitioner must be a candidate at the election or an elector; the petition must be presented by the petitioner; it must invoke the statutory grounds for challenging an election; it must be presented before the High Court; and it must be filed within the prescribed 45-day period.

The bench emphasised that Section 86(1) requires the High Court to dismiss an election petition that does not comply with Section 81. Consequently, the requirement governing presentation has substantive consequences for whether an election challenge can proceed.

The Court observed that compliance with Section 81 bears a direct connection to maintainability and that a defect in meeting the presentation requirement is not curable.

The bench attached particular significance to the word “by” in Section 81(1), which provides for presentation of an election petition by a candidate or elector.

Drawing upon G.V. Sreerama Reddy, the Court explained that an election petition is a serious proceeding capable of invalidating an electoral process. The procedure prescribed by election law must therefore be strictly followed.

Personal presentation enables the High Court to undertake preliminary verification at the filing stage and helps ensure that the proceeding is not frivolous or vexatious.

The Court also reiterated that the Representation of the People Act is a special, self-contained code governing election disputes. Referring to K. Venkateswara Rao v. Bekkam Narasimha Reddi and Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, it stressed the need for strict adherence to the requirements prescribed by that statutory framework.

The Supreme Court examined the legislative history of Section 81 to explain why presentation through an authorised representative could not be accepted under the present provision.

Before the 1966 amendment, Section 81(2) expressly permitted an election petition to be delivered to the Election Commission by the person making the petition or by a person authorised in writing. It also recognised presentation through registered post.

The Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 1966 omitted that subsection and transferred the forum for election petitions from the Election Commission to the High Court.

The bench noted that the current provision does not recognise the alternative modes of presentation expressly permitted under the earlier law.

The Court also considered whether the Madras High Court could frame rules governing the presentation and receipt of election petitions.

Relying on Jamal Uddin Ahmad v. Abu Saleh Najmuddin, the bench explained that the grant of statutory jurisdiction carries incidental powers necessary to make that jurisdiction effective. These include regulating administrative and ministerial functions associated with receiving documents, conducting preliminary scrutiny and placing matters before judges.

The Court distinguished these functions from judicial decision-making. Entrusting receipt of an election petition to a Registry officer does not amount to delegation of the High Court’s judicial function.

Accordingly, the bench held that Rule 7 of the Madras High Court Election Petitions Rules, 1967 operates within the statutory scheme. It regulates how an election petition is presented and received without contradicting Section 81.

The election petitioner maintained that he had personally presented the petition before the Registry on June 16, 2026. However, the Supreme Court found that this assertion lacked contemporaneous evidence establishing the act of presentation.

The CISF entry pass relied upon by him proved his entry into the High Court premises, but did not establish that he had personally presented the election petition.

The Court also noted that the receipt for the security deposit under Section 117 had been issued in the name of his counsel.

Addressing the petitioner’s reliance on CCTV footage, the bench observed that the footage could, at the highest, establish his presence on the premises. That did not establish personal presentation of the petition.

The ruling thus distinguishes between being present somewhere within the court premises and being present at the actual presentation of an election petition.

The Supreme Court acknowledged an earlier ruling recognising substantial compliance where another person physically presented the petition in the election petitioner’s immediate presence.

In Sheo Sadan Singh v. Mohan Lal Gautam, an advocate’s clerk had presented the election petition while the petitioner was immediately present. The Court had accepted that the requirement of presentation by the petitioner was satisfied in substance.

However, the bench clarified that the present petitioner had not claimed that he was present alongside his counsel when the election petition was presented. That precedent therefore did not assist him.

The bench also rejected reliance on Dr. Vijay Laxmi Sadho v. Jagdish. The decision involved a High Court rule requiring an election petition to be presented in English, although Section 81 contained no such language requirement. The Court distinguished a requirement arising solely from High Court rules from a requirement imposed by Section 81 itself.

It further explained that Section 86(1) expressly identifies non-compliance with Sections 81, 82 and 117 as grounds for threshold dismissal. Section 83, which concerns matters including pleadings and affidavits supporting allegations of corrupt practice, is not included in that list.

Therefore, observations concerning defects under Section 83 could not be used to excuse non-compliance with the personal presentation requirement under Section 81(1).

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