The Supreme Court has acquitted a man who had been convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for allegedly murdering his wife by setting her ablaze, holding that the prosecution failed to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt.
The bench Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran found serious infirmities in the prosecution case, including doubts surrounding the nature of the death, inconsistencies and procedural shortcomings in the dying declarations, and the failure of the prosecution to properly establish its case through the testimony of the deceased’s close relatives.
The prosecution case arose from an incident on May 6, 2013, when a quarrel allegedly took place between the appellant and his wife at their residence. According to the prosecution, the appellant was accustomed to consuming alcohol and had taken money kept by his wife in the house. When she questioned him about the missing money, he allegedly became enraged, poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze before leaving the scene.
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The prosecution relied principally upon the alleged homicidal nature of the death, two dying declarations attributed to the deceased, the post-mortem report and the alleged failure of the husband to explain the circumstances surrounding the death under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Trial Court accepted the prosecution version and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment, which was later affirmed by the High Court.
The case, however, came under scrutiny before the Supreme Court after the appellant challenged the conviction, pointing to inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence and serious doubts concerning the dying declarations.
One of the most significant aspects of the judgment was the Supreme Court’s examination of whether the prosecution had actually established that the deceased had been murdered.
The post-mortem report showed that the deceased had sustained 96% burns across the body. The injuries extended over the scalp, face, neck, chest, upper limbs, abdomen, lower limbs and genitalia, with only limited unburnt areas.
The Court noted that the distribution of burns raised a question regarding the prosecution theory that the accused had poured kerosene over his wife and set her on fire. The Court observed that the presence of burns over the scalp could also be indicative of the deceased having doused herself with kerosene.
Importantly, the Court pointed out that the prosecution doctor had not been cross-examined on this aspect and the defence had not specifically put to the doctor the question of whether the death could have been a suicide. Nevertheless, the Court found that the overall evidence left a doubt about whether the death was homicidal or suicidal.
The Supreme Court also attached considerable significance to the medical evidence concerning the deceased’s ability to give a coherent statement.
The post-mortem doctor had stated during cross-examination that a person suffering burns between 80% and 90% could remain conscious and capable of speaking properly. The deceased, however, had suffered 96% burns according to the post-mortem report. This discrepancy created doubt regarding whether she could have given the dying declarations attributed to her.
The Court therefore held that the medical evidence created a significant suspicion regarding the reliability of the dying declarations.
Another crucial factor was the testimony of the deceased’s close relatives.
The deceased’s sister, cousin and mother were examined as prosecution witnesses. According to the Supreme Court, their testimony did not contain any material incriminating circumstance against the accused during their examination-in-chief. They spoke about reaching the scene after hearing the deceased’s cries and attempting to extinguish the fire. One witness stated that the appellant was present and had also attempted to save the victim.
The Court noted that the evidence of these witnesses did not establish a sufficient motive for murder. A quarrel between the couple, by itself, was not considered sufficient to establish either a motive for murder or the accused’s involvement in the incident.
During cross-examination, the relatives also spoke about the possibility that the deceased had committed suicide because of ailments. They further claimed that the alleged dying declarations had been made under the influence of local political leaders, although the Supreme Court did not accept that allegation because it had not been substantiated.
The Supreme Court strongly criticised the manner in which the testimony of PW1 to PW3 had been dealt with by the High Court.
The High Court had treated the relatives as having been won over by the accused and considered their later version regarding suicide to be an afterthought. The Supreme Court disagreed with this approach.
The Court emphasised that the testimony actually given by witnesses before the Court must form the basis for determining guilt or innocence. Earlier statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC cannot simply be relied upon to convict an accused unless the necessary procedure for proving contradictions is followed.
The Supreme Court found that the earlier versions had not been properly put to the witnesses and the alleged contradictions had not been established through the Investigating Officer.
It further noted that PW1 to PW3 had not been declared hostile, nor had they been re-examined after they gave evidence exculpating the accused during cross-examination. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that these witnesses did not support the prosecution case.
The Court next examined the first dying declaration, which was allegedly recorded by a Head Constable.
The Head Constable was no longer available to testify. The statement was produced through a Sub-Inspector, who stated that he had received the statement and acted upon it by registering a case under Sections 498A and 307 IPC, which was subsequently altered to Section 302 IPC after the deceased died.
However, the Supreme Court noted that the Sub-Inspector did not affirm the signature of the Head Constable on the statement, nor was he confronted with the statement as the document he had allegedly received and relied upon for registration of the FIR.
This created an additional evidentiary difficulty concerning the first dying declaration.
The Court also identified a significant discrepancy concerning the timing of the first dying declaration and the registration of the FIR.
The evidence of PW8 showed that he received the statement recorded by the Head Constable at 1:00 a.m. on May 8, 2013. However, the dying declaration itself indicated that it had been recorded at 2:30 a.m. on May 7, 2013. The appellant suggested that the recorded time could have been a mistake and that the intended time was 8:30 a.m., with the recording continuing until approximately 9:15 a.m.
The Supreme Court found the discrepancy particularly important because, even assuming the declaration was recorded at around 9:15 a.m. on May 7, the FIR was registered only at 1:00 a.m. on May 8.
The Court specifically described the question of why the alleged dying declaration was registered as an FIR more than 15 hours later as crucial to the assessment of its reliability.
The second dying declaration was allegedly recorded by an Executive Magistrate. A doctor had certified that the deceased was conscious and fit to make a statement.
However, the Supreme Court noticed another serious inconsistency. The doctor who attended the deceased had testified that the injuries were between 95% and 100%, whereas the post-mortem surgeon had stated that a person could speak properly only when burns were in the range of 80% to 90%.
The Executive Magistrate had also recorded the time of the declaration as 8:55 a.m., which overlapped with the time at which the Head Constable was allegedly recording the other dying declaration.
These inconsistencies, considered cumulatively, led the Supreme Court to treat both dying declarations as suspicious.
The Court also noticed that the alleged motive attributed to the accused differed between the two dying declarations.
The prosecution had relied upon the alleged history of constant quarrels between the couple. However, the Supreme Court found that this alleged long-standing marital discord had not been established through reliable evidence.
The Court therefore held that the inconsistencies concerning motive, combined with the doubts surrounding the dying declarations and the unresolved question of whether the death was homicidal or suicidal, substantially weakened the prosecution case.
The prosecution had also relied upon the alleged failure of the accused to explain how his wife sustained fatal burns inside their marital home.
The Supreme Court, however, held that no adverse circumstance could be drawn against the accused merely on this basis because the relatives themselves had testified that the accused was present at the scene and had attempted to extinguish the fire.
Thus, the Court did not permit the burden arising under Section 106 to substitute for the prosecution’s obligation to establish the foundational facts of the offence.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove a single circumstance sufficient to sustain the conviction.
The Court held that reasonable doubt persisted regarding whether the deceased’s death had been caused by the accused or whether it could have been a case of suicide. In addition, the prosecution’s principal evidence—the dying declarations—was found to be surrounded by serious doubts, while the testimony of the deceased’s close relatives did not support the prosecution case.
The Court accordingly set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant.
It directed that if the appellant was not already released on bail, he should be set at liberty unless required in any other case. If he was already on bail, his bail bonds were ordered to stand cancelled.
The Supreme Court’s decision underscores that a conviction for murder cannot rest on an uncertain chain of circumstances. In the present case, doubts regarding the very nature of the death, inconsistencies in the dying declarations, questions surrounding their recording and timing, medical evidence concerning the victim’s ability to speak, and the failure of the prosecution to properly establish contradictions in witness testimony collectively created a reasonable doubt.
Finding that the prosecution had failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court restored the fundamental criminal-law principle that an accused cannot be convicted merely on suspicion when the prosecution evidence leaves substantial and unresolved doubt.
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