The Supreme Court has set aside the dismissal of an election petition challenging the election of the returned candidate from No. 7 Karimganj Parliamentary Constituency, Assam, holding that defects concerning attestation of copies of an election petition and the affidavit in Form-25 must be examined in the context of the statutory scheme and the nature of the defect.
The Bench of Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice J.B. Pardiwala restored the election petition to the High Court for consideration in accordance with the directions issued by the Supreme Court.
The appeal arose from an order of the High Court rejecting an election petition under Section 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The respondent was the successful candidate elected from the Karimganj Parliamentary Constituency in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections.
Buy Now: 50+ Supreme Court Judgments – July 2026
Three principal objections had been raised against the maintainability of the election petition.
First, it was alleged that the copy of the election petition served on the returned candidate contained a Form-25 affidavit that did not indicate that it had been notarised or otherwise duly attested.
Second, objections were raised regarding the manner in which the individual pages of the election petition had been attested. Pages 1 to 84 carried a rubber stamp stating “attested to be true copy of the petition”, while pages 85 to 185 carried a stamp stating “certified to be true copy”. The argument was that the latter form of endorsement did not constitute proper attestation under Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act.
Third, it was alleged that four pages—Pages 11, 16, 21 and 22—were missing from the copy of the election petition served on the respondent.
The High Court accepted the objection concerning improper attestation, did not deal with the notarisation issue in Form-25, and rejected the contention concerning the allegedly missing pages. The election petitioner thereafter approached the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court first examined the objection concerning the different rubber stamps used on the copies of the election petition.
The Court relied on its earlier decision in F.A. Sapa v. Singora, which had considered the requirements of Section 81(3) of the Representation of the People Act. Under Section 81(3), an election petition must be accompanied by as many copies as there are respondents, and every such copy must be attested by the election petitioner under his own signature as a true copy of the petition.
The Court noted that F.A. Sapa had made it clear that the petitioner’s signature at the foot of every page, certifying the copy as a true copy and taking responsibility for its correctness, is sufficient. The provision does not prescribe any particular form or wording of attestation.
The Bench therefore held that the different rubber stamps used in the present case conveyed the same essential meaning and were not sufficient grounds to reject the election petition.
“Different rubber stamps” could not, by themselves, invalidate the copies when the statutory requirement of the petitioner attesting them as true copies was otherwise satisfied. The Supreme Court accordingly reversed the High Court’s contrary finding.
The Court explained that Form-25 under the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, is required to be signed by the election petitioner and attested by a Magistrate of the First Class, a Notary or a Commissioner of Oaths, after the affidavit is solemnly affirmed before the prescribed authority.
In the present case, however, the copies supplied to the returned candidate did not show any indication of notarisation or attestation. When the Supreme Court examined the relevant pages of the paper book, it found that the copies did not even contain a printed affirmation with space for the signature of the Commissioner of Affidavits or the date.
This brought the case directly within the principles considered in earlier Supreme Court decisions concerning defects in election petitions and affidavits supporting allegations of corrupt practices.
A major part of the judgment deals with the relationship between three earlier decisions—Dr Shipra (Smt) & Others v. Shanti Lal Khoiwal & Others, T.M. Jacob v. C. Poulose & Others, and T. Phungzathang v. Hangkhanlian & Others.
The appellant argued that T.M. Jacob, a Constitution Bench decision, had effectively displaced the stricter approach adopted in Dr Shipra. Reliance was also placed on T. Phungzathang, which had applied the concepts of substantial compliance and curability in the context of defects in election petitions.
The Supreme Court rejected this understanding.
The Bench clarified that Dr Shipra had not been overruled by T.M. Jacob. Instead, the Constitution Bench in T.M. Jacobhad distinguished the factual circumstances before it from those considered in Dr Shipra.
According to the Court, the defect in T.M. Jacob was materially different because the copy supplied to the returned candidate contained an endorsement stating that the affidavit had been duly affirmed, signed and verified before a Notary. Although the name, address, stamp and seal of the Notary were absent, the copy did not create an apprehension of misrepresentation or suggest that the statutory requirement had not been complied with.
By contrast, the present case was found to be identical to the situation considered in Dr Shipra, where the copy supplied to the returned candidate gave no indication that the affidavit supporting the allegations of corrupt practice had been duly verified and attested.
In Dr Shipra, the Supreme Court had held that allegations of corrupt practice must be proved to the required standard and that serious defects in the copy supplied to the returned candidate could justify dismissal at the threshold. The Court had stressed the consequences associated with findings of corrupt practice, including possible disqualification.
The present Bench reiterated that Dr Shipra remains good law and expressly disagreed with the interpretation placed upon it in T. Phungzathang. The Court held that T. Phungzathang had misunderstood the Constitution Bench ruling in T.M. Jacob when it treated Dr Shipra as having been displaced.
Despite recognising the importance of proper attestation of Form-25, the Supreme Court drew an important distinction between defects affecting allegations of corrupt practices and independent grounds challenging an election.
The Court referred to the concluding portion of Dr Shipra, where it had been held that non-conformity of Form-25 with Rule 94A does not necessarily result in dismissal of the entire election petition under Section 86.
Instead, where the defect relates to the affidavit supporting allegations of corrupt practices, those portions containing such allegations may have to be struck off. Independent grounds challenging the election can still be tried and decided on their merits.
This distinction was central to the Supreme Court’s final directions in the present case.
The Supreme Court also relied upon the Constitution Bench decision in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore & Others.
That judgment had held that every variation between an original election petition and its copy does not necessarily make the petition non-maintainable. The relevant test is whether the copy is sufficiently true and whether the variation is such that an ordinary person could be misled.
The Constitution Bench had also held that a defect in verification under the applicable procedural requirements was not necessarily fatal to the maintainability of an election petition. Where the defect did not amount to misrepresentation or mislead the returned candidate, it would not automatically justify rejection.
The Supreme Court noted that Murarka Radhey Shyam, being a Constitution Bench decision, continues to govern the issue. It further observed that contrary views of smaller Benches must yield to the binding precedent of the larger Bench.
Having considered the applicable precedents, the Supreme Court found no justification for sustaining the High Court’s order.
The Court noted that the original Form-25 affidavit filed before the Court had in fact been affirmed before a Commissioner of Affidavits. It therefore directed the High Court to verify whether due attestation of the affirmation on oath was available in the original record.
If proper attestation is found in the original affidavit, the High Court has been directed to proceed with the election petition on merits.
If the required attestation is not available, the allegations of corrupt practices are not to be permitted to be urged. However, the High Court must still proceed with consideration of any other independent grounds pleaded in the election petition.
The Supreme Court consequently restored the election petition to the High Court and allowed the appeal.
Membership Required to Access Case Details & Order Copy
To view the complete Case Details and Download Order Copy, you must have an active membership. Please subscribe to continue.
