The Supreme Court held that the relevant date for determining limitation is the date of filing of the complaint or initiation of prosecution, and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence.
The bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria set aside the Delhi High Court’s decision that had quashed criminal proceedings on the ground of delay.
The case arose from an incident dated 9 May 2011, in which the complainant, Roma Ahuja, alleged that she was assaulted outside a court complex, suffering injuries on her head and other parts of the body. Two cross-FIRs were registered at Police Station Moti Nagar—one by the accused and the other by the complainant. While the charge sheet in the cross-case was filed within time, the charge sheet in the complainant’s FIR was filed after a delay of one year and 20 days.
The accused challenged the proceedings, arguing that the delay attracted the bar under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which prescribes limitation periods based on the severity of offences. The Delhi High Court accepted this contention and quashed the FIR, holding that the limitation period of one year had expired and that the delay was fatal to the prosecution.
Before the Supreme Court, the key issue was whether limitation should be computed from the date of filing of the complaint or from the date when the court takes cognizance of the offence. The Court examined the statutory framework under Chapter XXXVI of the CrPC and relied on the Constitution Bench judgment in Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, which had conclusively settled this question.
The Supreme Court held that the date of filing of the complaint or initiation of prosecution is the material date for computing limitation. It observed that taking cognizance is an act of the court and is subject to various factors, including administrative delays and judicial workload, over which the complainant has no control. Therefore, penalising a complainant for such delays would be unjust and contrary to the principles of fairness.
The Court further emphasised that criminal law must operate with certainty and should not depend on the subjective timing of judicial action. It noted that if the date of cognizance were to be treated as decisive, a diligent complainant could be unfairly prejudiced due to delays attributable to the court system. This would defeat the very purpose of justice delivery.
Reaffirming earlier precedents such as Bharat Kale v. State of A.P. and Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, the Court clarified that the limitation provisions are intended to bar stale prosecutions, not to punish litigants for delays beyond their control. It also reiterated the legal maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, meaning that an act of the court should prejudice no one.
Applying these principles to the present case, the Supreme Court found that the complaint had been initiated within the prescribed limitation period and that the subsequent delay in filing the charge sheet or taking cognizance could not render the proceedings invalid. Consequently, the Court set aside the Delhi High Court’s order and restored the criminal proceedings.
Case Details
Case Title: Roma Ahuja Versus The State And Another
Citation: JURISHOUR-696-SC-2026
Case No.: Criminal Appeal Nos. 1831-1832 Of 2026
Date: 09/04/2026
Read More: Transfer of 57 Assistant Commissioners Ordered in Kolkata CGST & Central Excise Zone
