The Supreme Court has held that inquiry under Section 202 of CrPC is Not Mandatory in Complaints by Public Servants.

The bench of Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah in criminal appeals arising out of Special Leave Petitions filed by the State of Kerala and the company, addresses two crucial legal questions: the computation of limitation for taking cognizance and the mandatory nature of inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) when the accused resides outside the court’s jurisdiction.

The matter originated from a complaint dated January 5, 2006, filed by one Joy Mandi before the Drugs Inspector (Intelligence Branch), Thrissur, alleging discrepancies in the labeling of a vaccine allegedly manufactured by Panacea Biotec Ltd.

According to the complaint, the outer carton of the vaccine described it as “Easy Five” (a pentavalent vaccine including Hepatitis B antigen), while the vial inside bore the label “Easy Four” (a tetravalent vaccine not containing the Hepatitis B component). The allegation was that the mismatch amounted to “misbranding” under Sections 17(b) and 17(c) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act read with Rule 96 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945.

Following inspection and seizure of invoices and related documents from various distributors, the Drugs Inspector filed a complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), Thrissur on January 20, 2009, invoking Sections 18(a)(i) and 27(d) of the Act. The CJM took cognizance and issued summons.

The accused challenged the proceedings before the Kerala High Court under Section 482 CrPC. By order dated July 14, 2022, the High Court quashed the complaint on the ground that the CJM had failed to conduct a mandatory inquiry under Section 202(1) CrPC since the accused were residing beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate.

The Court examined whether the complaint filed in January 2009 was barred by limitation under Sections 468 and 469 CrPC.

Section 27(d) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act prescribes imprisonment of up to two years, attracting a three-year limitation period under Section 468(2)(c) CrPC.

The key question was: when did the limitation period begin?

The Supreme Court held that the case fell under Section 469(1)(c) CrPC — where the identity of the offender becomes known only after investigation. Though the initial complaint was made in January 2006, the identity of all accused entities and individuals was established only upon inspection and verification, completed by April 18, 2006.

Accordingly, the three-year limitation period ran from April 18, 2006, expiring on April 17, 2009. Since the complaint was filed on January 20, 2009, it was within limitation.

The Court therefore ruled that the High Court erred in computing limitation from an earlier date and upheld the validity of cognizance on this ground.

The High Court had quashed the complaint on the basis that the Magistrate failed to conduct a mandatory inquiry under Section 202(1) CrPC before issuing process against accused residing outside his jurisdiction.

The State argued that such an inquiry is not mandatory when the complaint is filed by a public servant in discharge of official duties.

The Supreme Court relied on its earlier decision in Cheminova India Limited v State of Punjab, which held that the legislature has placed public servants on a different footing. Under the proviso to Section 200 CrPC, a Magistrate need not examine a public servant complainant on oath if the complaint is made in discharge of official duties.

The Court emphasized that the purpose of Section 202 CrPC is to prevent harassment of innocent persons. However, when a complaint is filed by a statutory authority such as a Drugs Inspector under Section 32 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, the same level of suspicion applicable to private complaints does not arise.

Distinguishing Birla Corporation Limited v Adventz Investments and Holdings Limited, which involved a private complainant, the Court held that the High Court wrongly applied the mandatory inquiry requirement in the present case.

It concluded that in complaints instituted by authorized public servants under the Act, non-holding of a Section 202 inquiry does not automatically vitiate the proceedings.

The Court also addressed the issue of vicarious liability under Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, which provides that when an offence is committed by a company, every person in charge of and responsible for the conduct of its business at the time of the offence shall be deemed guilty.

Noting that the original Managing Director had passed away during the pendency of proceedings, the Court directed that appropriate persons in charge of the company at the relevant time may be arrayed as accused upon application by the prosecution.

Allowing the State’s appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the Kerala High Court’s order and restored the summoning order dated July 10, 2012. The complaint will now proceed before the trial court in accordance with law.

In a connected appeal filed by the accused seeking quashing on limitation grounds, the Court dismissed the challenge, reiterating that the complaint was within time.

Case Details

Case Title: The State Of Kerala & Anr. Versus M/S. Panacea Biotec Ltd. & Anr. 

Citation: JURISHOUR-146-SC-2026 

Case No.: SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.4524 OF 2023

Date: 26/02/2026

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