Supreme Court judge Justice Ujjal Bhuyan has voiced strong constitutional concerns over the Collegium’s decision to transfer a High Court judge at the explicit request of the Central Government, warning that such a move undermines the very purpose of the Collegium system—judicial independence from executive and political influence.
In a pointed observation, Justice Bhuyan remarked that when the Collegium itself records that a High Court judge’s transfer is being made at the Centre’s request, it “reveals a striking intrusion of executive influence into what is constitutionally supposed to be an independent process.” He emphasised that the Collegium was judicially evolved precisely to insulate appointments and transfers from executive pressure, and any acknowledgment of government requests within Collegium resolutions strikes at the heart of that objective.
Context: Justice Atul Sreedharan’s Transfer
Justice Bhuyan’s remarks come in the backdrop of the recent transfer of Justice Atul Sreedharan from the Madhya Pradesh High Court to the Allahabad High Court. The Collegium resolution noted that the transfer was being made at the request of the Central Government—a disclosure that has since triggered debate within legal and constitutional circles.
Transfers of High Court judges are constitutionally permissible under Article 222 of the Constitution, but long-standing jurisprudence, beginning with the Second and Third Judges Cases, has clarified that such transfers must be based on judicial considerations and decided by the Collegium, with the executive playing only a consultative role. The executive’s primacy in such matters was explicitly rejected to preserve judicial independence.
A Constitutional Red Line?
Justice Bhuyan’s criticism goes beyond the individual transfer and raises a larger systemic issue: whether the Collegium, by expressly acting on a government request, risks diluting the constitutional firewall between the judiciary and the executive.
Legal experts point out that while the executive may convey inputs or concerns to the Collegium, the final decision must demonstrably remain that of the judiciary. Recording a transfer as being made “at the request of the Central Government” could create a perception—if not the reality—of executive influence over judicial careers.
Such perceptions, constitutional scholars warn, can have a chilling effect on judicial independence, particularly in cases involving governmental action, policy, or politically sensitive matters.
Renewed Debate on Collegium Transparency and Autonomy
Justice Bhuyan’s observations have also reignited the long-running debate on the functioning of the Collegium system itself—its opacity, internal accountability, and vulnerability to external pressures. While the Collegium was created to counterbalance executive dominance after the supersession controversies of the 1970s, critics argue that it now faces a different challenge: preserving its autonomy while maintaining transparency.
Supporters of Justice Bhuyan’s stance see it as a timely reminder that constitutional conventions are as important as constitutional text. Even procedurally valid actions, they argue, can become constitutionally suspect if they erode foundational principles like separation of powers and judicial independence.
