The Supreme Court has held that demanding a bribe is a criminal act unconnected with official duties and does not attract the protection of prior approval under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

A Bench of Justice S.V.N. Bhatti and Justice N.V. Anjaria dismissed an appeal by a Rajasthan police constable challenging the framing of a corruption charge against him. 

The bench held that the absence of prior approval under Section 17A did not invalidate the proceedings concerning his alleged demand of ₹1.5 lakh.

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The bench affirmed that Section 17A does not provide blanket protection to public servants against corruption investigations. Its application depends on whether the alleged offence relates to a recommendation made or a decision taken in the discharge of official functions. TEJARAM

Tejaram was posted as a constable in the office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police at Sirohi, Rajasthan. The complainant, Devendra Kumar, was also a constable and was posted at Abu City Police Station.

According to the background recorded in the judgment, the complainant had been sent to Madurai with another constable for investigation-related work. Tejaram alleged that the complainant had accepted illegal gratification from accused persons to allow them to escape.

Tejaram’s defence was that the complainant retaliated by sending a false email to the Anti-Corruption Bureau on April 22, 2021. That complaint alleged that Tejaram had demanded ₹1.5 lakh on behalf of the Superintendent of Police.

An FIR was registered on June 4, 2021, under Section 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. Tejaram was arrested on September 1, 2021.

Sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act was granted on December 8, 2023. A chargesheet followed on January 19, 2024, and the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Pali, framed a charge under Section 7 of the Act on September 12, 2024.

The Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur dismissed his criminal revision petition on March 26, 2025, prompting his appeal to the Supreme Court.

Senior Advocate Abhimanyu Bhandari, appearing for Tejaram, argued that investigators were required to obtain approval under Section 17A before initiating an investigation against him as a public servant.

The defence maintained that the provision created a mandatory bar against an inquiry or investigation concerning acts performed in the discharge of official functions without approval from the competent authority. It further contended that failure to obtain such approval could not be cured subsequently.

The appellant also relied on earlier decisions concerning Section 17A and referred to pending questions about the nature and validity of the statutory protection.

Opposing the appeal, Additional Advocate General Sansriti Pathak, appearing for Rajasthan, submitted that Section 17A did not confer blanket immunity. The State argued that demanding illegal gratification was neither part of Tejaram’s official duties nor connected with any official recommendation or decision.

Examining the language of Section 17A, the Supreme Court explained that prior approval is required where the alleged offence relates to a recommendation made or a decision taken by a public servant in the discharge of official functions or duties.

The Court identified these as essential conditions for invoking the provision. Public servant status alone does not bring every alleged act within its protection.

The Bench observed, “The Section cannot be viewed to have an omnibus application.”

The Court explained that the statutory protection operates within the boundaries set by the provision itself. There must be an identifiable recommendation or decision, and that recommendation or decision must have been made in the discharge of official duties.

In the present case, those conditions were absent. The allegation concerned a demand for illegal gratification, which the Court treated as conduct outside the discharge of official functions.

Applying that interpretation, the Bench held that the alleged demand of ₹1.5 lakh could not be regarded as part of Tejaram’s official duties.

The judgment states: “The act of demanding a bribe is a pure criminal act, not connected with official functions…”

The Court found no linkage between the alleged demand and any recommendation made or decision taken by Tejaram in his official capacity. Consequently, Section 17A did not apply, and the absence of approval under that provision did not vitiate the initiation of criminal proceedings.

This conclusion concerned the legal validity of proceeding with the prosecution. The Court left the merits of the allegations and the parties’ competing factual contentions for trial.

The Bench relied on Central Bureau of Investigation v. Santosh Karnani, where the Supreme Court had rejected a challenge based on the absence of Section 17A approval in a bribery case. That decision distinguished allegations of demanding a bribe from matters involving recommendations or decisions made in an official capacity.

The Court also referred to Surendra Dhariwal v. State of Rajasthan and Anil Daima v. State of Rajasthan. In the latter case, the Supreme Court had held that Section 17A could not be applied to cases involving demands for illegal gratification.

The judgment further discussed Kerala High Court decisions explaining that criminal conduct without a connection to official duties does not fall within the provision’s protective scope.

The appellant had also drawn attention to the reference concerning the validity of Section 17A in Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, made by an order dated January 13, 2026.

The Supreme Court held that the reference did not prevent it from deciding this appeal. Since Section 17A was inapplicable to the allegations against Tejaram, the case could be resolved without awaiting the larger Bench’s determination.

The Court separately considered the objection concerning the timing of sanction for prosecution under Section 19.

It noted that prosecution sanction had been obtained before cognizance was taken. On the facts of the case, the Bench rejected the contention that the alleged belated sanction invalidated the proceedings, treating the objection as, at most, an irregularity that did not vitiate the prosecution or the trial.

The judgment thus addressed the two provisions separately: Section 17A concerns approval for an inquiry or investigation in specified circumstances, while Section 19 concerns sanction for prosecution.

Upholding the Rajasthan High Court’s decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and sustained the framing of the charge.

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