The Supreme Court has clarified the scope of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, holding that an application for redetermination of compensation under the provision must be founded on an award of the Reference Court and cannot ordinarily be revived by a subsequent High Court appellate order.
The Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran allowed the appeal filed by the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) and set aside the High Court order which had permitted the landowners’ Section 28A application. The judgment was delivered on September 21, 2026.
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The dispute arose from land acquisition proceedings initiated under Section 4(1) read with Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The lands belonging to the respondents’ predecessors-in-interest were acquired and an award was passed on February 15, 1977.
The compensation awarded was admittedly received by the predecessors-in-interest. They did not seek a reference under Section 18 of the 1894 Act.
Other landowners whose lands were covered by the same notification, however, sought references under Section 18. Their references were rejected by the Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad, on November 25, 1981. An appeal was subsequently filed before the High Court.
The High Court disposed of the appeal on April 18, 2022. Within three months of that order, on May 23, 2022, the respondents filed an application under Section 28A seeking redetermination of compensation.
The Collector rejected the application on the ground that it was based on the High Court’s appellate decision rather than an award passed by the Reference Court under Section 18.
High Court Relied on Earlier Supreme Court Rulings
The landowners challenged the Collector’s decision before the High Court.
The High Court relied principally upon the Supreme Court’s three-Judge Bench ruling in Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari, which had held that the benefit of Section 28A could arise from successive awards passed by the Reference Court and was not confined to the first award.
The High Court also relied upon Banwari v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd., where landowners who had not sought a Section 18 reference were permitted to invoke Section 28A within three months of a High Court appellate order where the original reference had been rejected and the High Court granted enhancement for the first time.
Supreme Court Examines Conflicting Section 28A Precedents
The Supreme Court undertook an extensive examination of the case law governing Section 28A, particularly concerning two questions: who can invoke the provision and from which order the three-month limitation period begins.
In Pradeep Kumari, the Court had held that Section 28A could be invoked on the basis of any successive award of the Reference Court, provided the statutory requirements were satisfied. The Court had identified six conditions, including that the award must be made by the Court under Part III, the compensation must have been enhanced over the Collector’s award, the applicant’s land must have been covered by the same Section 4(1) notification, the applicant must not have sought a Section 18 reference, the application must be made within three months of the relevant award, and only one Section 28A application could be filed by an applicant.
However, the Supreme Court noted that Pradeep Kumari contemplated invocation of Section 28A on the basis of an award of the Reference Court and not merely an appellate order passed by the High Court.
High Court Appellate Order Does Not Normally Trigger Fresh Limitation
The Supreme Court also considered its earlier three-Judge Bench judgment in Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese v. Land Acquisition Collector.
In that case, the Court examined whether an appellate order under Section 54 could constitute the “award” contemplated by Section 28A. It held that the limitation period runs from the award of the Reference Court and not from the subsequent appellate order of the High Court.
The Court further referred to Hansoli Devi, where the principle that limitation is computed from the Reference Court’s award was reaffirmed.
Exception Where Reference Itself Was Rejected
At the same time, the Supreme Court carefully distinguished the situation dealt with in Banwari.
In Banwari, the Section 18 reference itself had been rejected without any enhancement of compensation. The first enhancement occurred only when the High Court decided the first appeal. The Supreme Court explained that, in such a peculiar situation, a landowner who had not sought a Section 18 reference could derive a Section 28A right from the High Court’s first enhancement because there had previously been no cause of action under Section 28A.
The present case, however, was materially different.
2019 High Court Order Had Already Triggered Limitation
The Court found that the High Court’s April 18, 2022 order did not itself create a new entitlement to invoke Section 28A.
Instead, that order merely relied upon an earlier High Court appellate decision dated July 8, 2019, in First Appeal No. 593 of 1982.
According to the Supreme Court, the first enhancement had therefore already occurred on July 8, 2019. Consequently, the three-month limitation period commenced from that date and expired on October 7, 2019.
The later order dated April 18, 2022, merely following the earlier appellate order, could not generate a fresh limitation period.
Limitation Runs from Award, Not Date of Knowledge
The Court relied upon its earlier ruling in Popat Bahiru Govardhane, emphasizing that the limitation period under Section 28A begins from the date of the relevant award and not from the date on which the affected landowner acquires knowledge of it.
The Court observed that limitation provisions must be applied as prescribed by statute even where their operation may appear harsh in an individual case.
Section 28A Cannot Be Used for Repeated Applications
The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that successive High Court appellate orders could give rise to successive Section 28A applications.
It emphasized that Section 28A permits a landowner who did not seek a Section 18 reference to apply for redetermination where another landowner’s reference under the same notification resulted in enhancement by the Reference Court.
The Court further noted that Section 28A(3) provides the applicant with a remedy of seeking a reference against the Collector’s award under Section 28A(2). This statutory mechanism would not fit an application founded directly upon a High Court appellate enhancement.
Supreme Court Rejects Doctrine of Fresh Cause of Action Through Successive Appeals
The respondents had argued that the principle of successive awards giving rise to fresh causes of action should also apply where successive appellate orders were passed.
The Supreme Court rejected this contention in the facts of the case.
It explained that Pradeep Kumari concerned successive awards of the Reference Court, including circumstances where a later award provided higher compensation or where different villages covered by the same acquisition notification were involved. Those circumstances were absent in the present dispute because the respondents’ lands were in the same village as the lands involved in the earlier appeals.
Supreme Court Declines to Expand Section 28A Through Andanayya
The respondents also relied on Andanayya v. Deputy Chief Engineer, which had taken a broader view regarding a second Section 28A application after a High Court award.
The Supreme Court declined to accept that proposition, observing that it would conflict with earlier three-Judge Bench decisions, including Jose Antonio Cruz, as well as the principles laid down in Pradeep Kumari and Hansoli Devi.
The Court reiterated that only one application under Section 28A for redetermination of compensation is permissible for an applicant.
Court’s Final Holding
The Supreme Court ultimately held that Section 28A can be invoked on the basis of an award of the Reference Court. Where an application has already been filed within limitation and an appeal against the Reference Court’s award is pending, the Collector may keep the application in abeyance so that any subsequent enhancement by the High Court can appropriately benefit the applicant.
However, a subsequent High Court appellate order cannot ordinarily create a fresh Section 28A limitation period where the right had already arisen from an earlier award or enhancement.
The Court also emphasized that successive orders in a first appeal cannot independently confer fresh causes of action under Section 28A.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned High Court order and rejected the respondents’ Section 28A application. Any pending applications were also directed to stand rejected.
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