The Supreme Court has held that a civil court cannot pass protective or preservatory interim orders in a proposed suit concerning a public charitable or religious trust while an application seeking leave under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 remains pending.
The Bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Manmohan ruled that leave under Section 92 is a mandatory condition precedent to the institution of such a suit. Until leave is granted, there is no validly instituted suit or pending lis in which the court can exercise supplemental powers, including the power to appoint a receiver under Order XL Rule 1 CPC.
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The Court, however, carved out an important procedural safeguard for urgent cases. It held that where the facts disclose a compelling need for immediate relief, the court may dispense with notice to the proposed defendants and grant leave ex parte after recording cogent reasons in writing. Once leave is granted and the suit comes into existence, the court may consider interim relief. The defendants retain the right to seek revocation of the leave.
The judgment was delivered in S. Panchalingu & Ors. v. People’s Education Trust (R) & Ors., arising from a Karnataka High Court decision dated June 25, 2025. The ruling is reported as 2026 INSC 1010.
The dispute arose after the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mandya, constituted an ad hoc committee comprising the existing trustees to manage the day-to-day affairs of People’s Education Trust while the application for leave under Section 92 was yet to be decided.
The order dated May 2, 2025 was passed under Order XL Rule 1(a) CPC. The Karnataka High Court later set it aside, holding that a suit under Section 92 remains “stillborn” until leave is granted and that the civil court therefore lacks jurisdiction to pass interlocutory orders during the pre-leave stage.
The appellants approached the Supreme Court, raising the substantial question whether a civil court seized of a plaint under Section 92, together with a leave application, could pass protective or preservatory interim orders before deciding the application for leave.
The Supreme Court noted a divergence of judicial opinion among High Courts. The Allahabad, Bombay, Kerala and Madras High Courts had recognised a protective jurisdiction pending the grant of leave. The Orissa and Karnataka High Courts had taken the contrary view and held that such jurisdiction stood excluded.
The appellants argued that a court considering a Section 92 leave application could not be reduced to a “mute spectator” when trust property required immediate protection. They relied on Section 94, Order XL Rule 1 and the inherent powers preserved by Section 151 CPC. They also contended that a receiver merely acts as the hand of the court to preserve property and does not adjudicate the parties’ rights or grant any of the final reliefs listed in Section 92.
The respondents maintained that an application for leave is only a threshold proceeding and not a substantive action in which rights can be adjudicated. According to them, the expression “having obtained the leave of the Court” makes prior leave indispensable to the very institution of the suit. They further argued that appointing a receiver could displace the existing management and undermine the statutory protection given to public trusts against vexatious litigation.
The Supreme Court described Section 92 as a special provision governing representative suits brought in the interests of the beneficiaries of public charitable or religious trusts. Such actions are not filed to enforce private rights but to protect the larger public interest.
The Court explained that the provision serves two objectives. It permits two or more interested persons to approach the court over an alleged breach or the need for directions in the administration of a public trust without joining every beneficiary. At the same time, it shields public trusts and their trustees from vexatious proceedings and prevents charitable funds from being wasted in unnecessary litigation.
For this reason, the Court characterised Section 92 as both a “protective shield” and a “remedial sword”. The requirement of leave represents the balance between safeguarding trust property from mismanagement and protecting public charities from harassment.
The Court identified three cumulative requirements for a suit under Section 92: the trust must have been created for a public charitable or religious purpose; there must be an alleged breach of trust or a need for judicial directions concerning its administration; and the relief sought must fall within those enumerated in Section 92(1).
Rejecting the appellants’ contention, the Bench held that registration of a leave application as a separate miscellaneous petition under the Karnataka Civil Rules of Practice does not convert it into a substantive proceeding.
The consideration of leave is a threshold exercise. The substantive proceeding is the suit itself, which comes into existence only after leave is granted. The words “having obtained the leave of the Court” in Section 92, read with the statutory bar against instituting a non-conforming suit, establish that prior leave is peremptory and non-derogable.
Consequently, the Court held that until leave is granted, there is no pending proceeding in which an interlocutory application can be entertained.
The Supreme Court held that supplemental proceedings under Section 94 necessarily presuppose an underlying proceeding. The power cannot be used to bypass the “gateway proceeding” of obtaining leave under Section 92.
An application for appointment of a receiver under Order XL Rule 1 cannot therefore be maintained before leave is granted. In the absence of leave, the original action does not mature into a proceeding capable of supporting a supplemental application.
The expression “whether before or after decree” in Order XL Rule 1 was also held to presuppose the existence of a validly instituted suit. Since there can be no decree without a properly instituted suit, the provision cannot apply during the pre-leave stage of a Section 92 action.
The Court further observed that appointment of a receiver over a public trust is not merely preservatory. It is an intrusive measure capable of dislodging the trust’s management. If leave were ultimately refused after a receiver had already been installed, the existing management would have suffered prejudice despite the suit never having been validly instituted.
The Bench rejected reliance on Section 141 CPC, which applies the procedure governing suits to other civil proceedings as far as possible. It held that Section 141 extends procedural rules but cannot alter substantive rights or override the protections built into Section 92.
The Court also ruled that Section 151 could not be invoked to appoint a receiver before leave. Inherent powers complement powers expressly conferred by the CPC but cannot operate in conflict with a special statutory provision. Such powers and interpretative principles preserving jurisdiction can be used only where jurisdiction already exists.
Since Section 92 is a special provision, it prevails over the general inherent power under Section 151. Interim relief must also be in aid of final relief in a properly instituted suit, not in aid of a proceeding the court is not yet competent to entertain.
While denying jurisdiction to issue interim orders during the pendency of leave, the Supreme Court acknowledged that urgent circumstances may require immediate judicial intervention to protect the assets of a public charity.
The solution, the Court held, lies in expediting the statutory gateway rather than bypassing it. Ordinarily, proposed defendants should receive notice before leave is granted. But notice is not indispensable where compelling urgency is shown. In such a case, the court may grant leave ex parte after recording prima facie cogent reasons and thereafter exercise its power to issue appropriate interim directions.
An ex parte grant of leave does not render the suit defective or non-maintainable. The affected defendants may apply for revocation, which the court must decide on its merits and in accordance with law.
This mechanism, the Bench said, harmonises the two purposes of Section 92: protection of public trusts against baseless litigation and the availability of an effective remedy where trust property faces an immediate threat.
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