The Supreme Court has set aside the conviction of a man sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder and sexual assault of a six-year-old child, holding that the prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
A Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva extended the benefit of doubt to the appellant, who had already undergone more than 16 years and seven months of incarceration.
The bench found several missing links in the prosecution’s circumstantial evidence, including an unproved “last-seen” theory, a disclosure statement that led to no new discovery, material inconsistencies in witness testimony and the absence of DNA comparison.
Buy Now: Supreme Court Judgments E-Compilation – August 2026
The Court held that an extra-judicial confession is inherently a weak piece of evidence and cannot, without independent and cogent corroboration, form the sole basis of a criminal conviction.
The appeal challenged an October 18, 2022 judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the appellant’s challenge to his conviction.
An Ambala Sessions Court had convicted him for offences punishable under Sections 302, 201 and 377 of the Indian Penal Code. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, five years’ rigorous imprisonment for causing the disappearance of evidence and ten years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 377. The substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently.
Setting aside both the Trial Court judgment and the High Court decision, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution had failed to prove the appellant’s connection with the victim, his presence at the alleged scene of the offence or that the victim was in his company at the relevant time.
The case arose from the death of a six-year-old boy who went missing after attending a village wedding on March 11, 2007. His body was recovered from an old well the following day.
There was no direct eyewitness to the alleged offence. The prosecution relied principally upon the “last-seen together” theory, an alleged extra-judicial confession made before the village Sarpanch, a disclosure statement attributed to the appellant, the recovery of an open packet of namkeen and forensic evidence concerning the detection of semen.
According to the prosecution, the appellant purchased a packet of namkeen and two tablets for treating a cold while accompanied by the child. It was alleged that he subsequently assaulted and killed the child before throwing the body into the well.
The prosecution further alleged that, two days after the body was recovered, the appellant confessed before the village Sarpanch and was taken to the police station.
The Supreme Court found that the prosecution witnesses did not conclusively establish that the appellant and the child had been seen together at the relevant time.
The shopkeeper from whom the appellant allegedly purchased the namkeen and tablets did not state in his examination-in-chief that any child was accompanying the appellant.
Another witness also failed to mention in his examination-in-chief, or in his earlier police statement, that the child was present with the appellant. The assertion that the child had accompanied the appellant emerged only during cross-examination.
The Supreme Court observed that this appeared to be an improvement in the witness’s version intended to support the prosecution case.
Significantly, the High Court itself had found that the testimony of the witnesses did not firmly establish that the appellant and the deceased had been seen together. Despite this finding, it upheld the conviction by relying upon a suggestion made by defence counsel during cross-examination.
The Supreme Court found this approach erroneous. It observed that the High Court could not, on one hand, conclude that the prosecution witnesses failed to establish the last-seen theory and, on the other, treat that very theory as an incriminating circumstance clinching the appellant’s guilt.
The Court also expressed serious doubt over the prosecution’s reliance upon an open packet of namkeen recovered near the scene.
Evidence showed that the product was a generic and readily available brand, with thousands of similar packets sold by shops throughout the village. No evidence connected the packet recovered from the spot with the packet allegedly purchased by the appellant.
The Court found it significant that the police seized the packet on March 12, 2007, while the story about the appellant purchasing namkeen allegedly emerged only on March 14, when the purported confession was recorded.
The Supreme Court observed that the seizure appeared to have been used to create a link and corroborate the last-seen theory. No wrapper of the cold tablets allegedly purchased by the appellant was recovered from the scene either.
The prosecution claimed that the appellant confessed before the village Sarpanch on March 14, 2007 and was thereafter handed over to the police.
However, prosecution witnesses stated that the police had brought the appellant to the shop on March 12, two days before the alleged confession.
The Trial Court had treated this as a minor discrepancy attributable to fading human memory. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the contradiction affected a crucial link in the prosecution case.
If the appellant was already in police custody or had been brought by the police to the shop on March 12, the Court noted, it would undermine the prosecution’s claim that he voluntarily approached the Sarpanch and confessed on March 14.
The discrepancy therefore could not be brushed aside as an insignificant error.
The Supreme Court found no plausible explanation for why the appellant would make an extra-judicial confession before the village Sarpanch, with whom neither he nor the victim had any established connection.
The Trial Court had regarded the Sarpanch as a neutral witness because he had no enmity with the appellant and no close relationship with the victim. It also reasoned that the appellant might have approached him because of his friendly relationship with the police.
Rejecting that reasoning, the Supreme Court observed that there could be several reasons why the Sarpanch might not have testified truthfully. The possibility that he wanted to assist the police in showing that the brutal crime had been solved could not be ruled out.
The Court noted that the victim’s death would naturally have caused considerable anger in the village, while the appellant was a poor labourer who may not have enjoyed the sympathy of the villagers.
Reiterating the legal position, the Bench held that courts proposing to base a conviction on an extra-judicial confession must ensure that the confession inspires confidence and is supported by other prosecution evidence.
Where such a confession suffers from material discrepancies or inherent improbabilities, it must be excluded from consideration.
The Supreme Court also rejected the prosecution’s reliance upon the disclosure statement purportedly made by the appellant in police custody.
Under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, only that part of the information supplied by an accused in custody which distinctly relates to a fact subsequently discovered is admissible. The provision is now incorporated in the proviso to Section 23(2) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.
In the present case, no incriminating article or previously unknown fact was discovered pursuant to the disclosure statement.
The body had already been recovered from the well on March 12, while the disclosure statement was recorded on March 14. The locations allegedly identified by the appellant were also already known to the investigating agency, and a site plan had been prepared before the statement was recorded.
The Supreme Court therefore held that the alleged disclosure statement could not be taken into consideration.
It further found that the High Court had committed a clear factual error in repeatedly stating that the disclosure statement led to the recovery of the child’s body. The body had, in fact, been discovered two days earlier.
The prosecution also relied upon the detection of human semen on the appellant’s underwear and in the rectal swab obtained from the deceased.
However, no DNA test was conducted to determine whether the biological material found on the two exhibits matched.
The Trial Court had reasoned that the unmarried appellant failed to explain the presence of semen on his underwear. The High Court similarly placed the burden upon the defence to show that the samples did not belong to the same person.
The Supreme Court held that this impermissibly shifted the burden of proof onto the accused.
Since the prosecution had produced no scientific evidence connecting the two samples, the courts below could not presume that they were the same and require the appellant to prove otherwise.
The Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove:
- That the child was in the appellant’s company at the relevant time;
- That the appellant was present at or connected with the scene of the offence;
- That the namkeen packet recovered from the spot was purchased by the appellant;
- That the alleged disclosure statement led to the discovery of any new fact;
- That the alleged extra-judicial confession was reliable and independently corroborated; and
- That the forensic samples found on the appellant and the victim were scientifically connected.
The Court held that these were not minor inconsistencies but substantial missing links in a case resting entirely on circumstantial evidence.
It observed that the prosecution’s evidence raised serious doubts about the veracity of its case and did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had committed the offences.
Membership Required to Access Case Details & Order Copy
To view the complete Case Details and Download Order Copy, you must have an active membership. Please subscribe to continue.
