The Supreme Court has dissolved a marriage under Section 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, after finding that the wife had deserted her husband by refusing, without reasonable cause, to return to the matrimonial home.
The bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Shree Chandrashekhar has observed that mere willingness expressed during court proceedings cannot disprove desertion when the spouse’s conduct demonstrates a sustained intention to abandon the matrimonial relationship, the Supreme Court has ruled.
The bench noted that although the wife claimed during her deposition that she was willing to fulfil her marital obligations, such a statement could not override conduct showing that she had actively chosen to remain separated from her husband.
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The parties were married on June 23, 2003. According to the husband, differences arose shortly after the marriage, with the wife allegedly insulting him over his educational qualifications and describing him as illiterate and rustic.
The husband claimed that during approximately two years of marriage, the wife stayed with him only four or five times, and that too after considerable persuasion. He further alleged that her conduct was cruel and that the marriage could not be consummated.
The wife returned to her parental home on November 30, 2005. The husband asserted that he went to bring her back on December 15, 2005, but she refused to accompany him. The parties thereafter remained continuously separated and had no children from the marriage.
In June 2007, the husband instituted divorce proceedings under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act on the grounds of desertion and mental cruelty.
The Trial Court rejected the allegations of cruelty, finding that the claims concerning denial of sexual relations, abusive language and insults directed at the husband and his family had not been satisfactorily proved.
On desertion, however, the Trial Court accepted the husband’s case that the wife had refused to return with him on December 15, 2005. It relied particularly on the testimony of a witness who had accompanied the husband to the wife’s parental home. That testimony was not challenged during the proceedings.
Despite recording that the wife had deserted the husband from December 15, 2005, the Trial Court dismissed the divorce petition. It concluded that the fact that the wife had been living separately was not, by itself, sufficient to grant divorce.
The husband challenged the decision before the High Court.
The High Court dismissed the husband’s appeal after holding that neither cruelty nor desertion had been established.
It found the evidence produced by the husband concerning cruelty to be unreliable. Regarding desertion, the High Court acknowledged that the parties had been living separately since December 2005 but held that physical separation alone did not amount to desertion under Section 13(1)(ib).
The High Court relied on the wife’s statements that she had never refused to perform her marital obligations, did not dislike the husband and continued to accept him as her spouse. On this basis, it concluded that the husband had failed to establish animus deserendi—the intention to bring marital cohabitation permanently to an end.
The husband argued that the Trial Court had expressly found that the wife deserted him on December 15, 2005. Since the wife had neither filed an appeal nor raised a cross-objection against that finding, it had become final and binding upon her.
He submitted that desertion continuing for at least two years constituted an independent statutory ground for divorce. Therefore, once the Trial Court found that the statutory requirement had been satisfied, it ought to have granted a divorce decree.
The husband also challenged the adverse inference drawn against him for not instituting proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights. He contended that Section 13(1)(ib) did not require a deserted spouse to first seek restitution of conjugal rights before applying for divorce.
The wife, in response, maintained that the High Court had correctly reassessed the evidence and found that the essential ingredients of desertion had not been proved.
The Supreme Court noted that there was no dispute that the parties had lived separately since December 15, 2005. The principal question was whether the High Court was justified in finding that the wife lacked the intention to desert her husband.
Explaining the law, the Court said desertion means the intentional and permanent abandonment of one spouse by the other, without consent and without reasonable cause. It is not merely withdrawal from a physical place but withdrawal from the obligations inherent in marriage.
Two elements must ordinarily be established against the deserting spouse: the fact of separation and the intention to permanently end cohabitation. From the perspective of the deserted spouse, there must be an absence of consent and an absence of conduct providing reasonable cause for the other spouse to leave.
The Court emphasised that desertion is a continuing course of conduct and must be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case. It need not always involve one spouse physically leaving the other, since constructive desertion may also be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.
Applying these principles, the Bench found that the wife’s courtroom assertion that she remained willing to perform her marital obligations was insufficient when her actual conduct pointed in the opposite direction.
The evidence accepted by the Trial Court established that the husband and another person had visited the wife’s parental home to bring her back, but she refused to accompany them without offering a reasonable cause.
The Supreme Court therefore concluded that the wife had actively chosen to desert her husband and that the High Court had erred in finding that the necessary intention was absent.
The Court also took note of the fact that the parties had remained separated for more than two decades, had no children and had failed to resolve the dispute despite mediation.
During the pendency of the appeal, the matter was referred to the Supreme Court Mediation Centre to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement. The mediation proceedings, however, failed in April 2014.
Referring to its earlier ruling in Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, the Court observed that although preserving marriage remains an important objective of matrimonial law, courts must recognise the reality of a relationship that has broken down beyond repair.
Where parties have remained apart for a sufficiently long period, compelling them to continue an unworkable marriage may prolong their misery instead of protecting the sanctity of marriage, the Bench noted.
The Court also referred to the Constitution Bench decision in Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, which recognised prolonged separation as an important factor in determining whether a marital bond has become incapable of restoration.
It clarified, however, that the present marriage was not being dissolved through the Supreme Court’s extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. The divorce was granted on the statutory ground of desertion under the Hindu Marriage Act.
The Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the High Court rejecting the allegation of cruelty.
The husband had therefore succeeded only partly in his appeal. The marriage was dissolved exclusively on the ground of desertion under Section 13(1)(ib).
The Supreme Court asked the husband how much he was willing to pay as permanent alimony if the marriage was dissolved. He offered ₹5 lakh.
Considering the facts and circumstances, the Court enhanced the amount and directed him to pay ₹7 lakh to the wife as permanent alimony.
The amount must be deposited before the Trial Court within three months from the date of the judgment. If the husband fails to make the payment within that period, the wife will be entitled to initiate execution proceedings for recovery.
The unpaid amount will also carry interest at nine per cent per annum after the expiry of the three-month deadline.
The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s finding that desertion had not been proved, and dissolved the marriage solemnised on June 23, 2003. No order was passed regarding costs.
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