The Supreme Court has quashed a one-year externment order passed against a Chhattisgarh resident, holding that the District Magistrate reopened a closed proceeding without statutory authority and ordered his removal from several districts without issuing a fresh notice or providing an opportunity of hearing.
The bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu observed that an externment order seriously restricts a citizen’s fundamental freedom of movement and cannot be passed routinely, merely because several criminal cases have been registered against the person.
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The Court also expressed surprise that the Chhattisgarh High Court adopted a “hands-off approach” and relegated the affected person to the statutory appellate remedy despite the externment order suffering from an “egregious violation of law”.
The dispute arose from an order dated November 4, 2025, passed by the District Magistrate, Raigarh, directing the appellant to remove himself from Raigarh district and the adjoining districts for one year.
The original externment proceeding had been initiated following a memorandum dated April 3, 2019, submitted by the Superintendent of Police, Raigarh. The recommendation relied upon the appellant’s alleged involvement in 10 criminal cases registered between 2009 and 2019.
However, on October 6, 2025, the District Magistrate closed the proceeding after recording that the appellant had been acquitted in the cases referred to by the Superintendent of Police and that no fresh police report had been submitted against him after 2019. The appellant was let off with a warning not to engage in criminal activities in the future.
Subsequently, the Superintendent of Police submitted a fresh report on November 3, 2025, referring to two later developments.
The first concerned an FIR registered in 2023 under the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, relating to the alleged unauthorised development of a colony. The second concerned an FIR registered on October 30, 2025, alleging that the appellant recorded and circulated a social media video containing abusive remarks against Baba Guru Ghasidas, a revered figure of the Satnami community.
The appellant was arrested in the latter case and lodged in the District Jail, Raigarh. Acting on the fresh police report, the District Magistrate recalled the closure order and passed the externment order while the appellant was in judicial custody.
Before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that the externment order was passed behind his back while he remained in custody. He was neither informed about the revival of the proceeding nor given an opportunity to respond to the fresh allegations.
It was argued that Section 8 of the Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990, expressly requires the District Magistrate to inform the proposed externee in writing about the general nature of the material allegations and provide a reasonable opportunity to tender an explanation.
The appellant also maintained that the District Magistrate had no express or implied statutory power to review, recall or reopen the earlier order by which the externment case had been closed.
The State defended the order by arguing that it was a continuation of the original proceeding rather than a fresh action or an impermissible review. It submitted that the appellant had already been heard in the earlier proceeding and, therefore, no fresh opportunity was required before reconsidering the matter in light of subsequent events.
Rejecting the State’s contention, the Supreme Court held that notice and a reasonable opportunity of hearing under Section 8 are mandatory conditions precedent for exercising the power of externment under Sections 3 to 6 of the 1990 Act.
The purpose of Section 8, the Court explained, is to ensure that a person facing externment is made aware of the material allegations and receives an effective opportunity to explain them.
An order passed in breach of these mandatory requirements would stand vitiated and be liable to be declared void from its inception, the Bench observed.
The Court noted that Section 8 also permits the affected person to produce witnesses, file a written statement and be represented by a legal practitioner. These protections demonstrate the importance of natural justice within the statutory framework.
The District Magistrate can proceed ex parte only in the specified circumstances contemplated under Section 8(5), such as when the person fails to execute the required security bond or fails to appear during the inquiry. None of those circumstances existed in the present case.
Accordingly, the Court found no legal basis for dispensing with notice and hearing before passing the order.
The Supreme Court separately held that the District Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to reopen the earlier externment proceeding.
The Court reiterated the settled position that an administrative authority cannot review its earlier order unless the governing statute expressly or impliedly confers such power.
No provision of the Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam authorising the District Magistrate to review or recall the closure order was shown to the Court.
The Bench further held that an alleged breach of the warning issued while closing the original proceeding could not, by itself, confer power on the District Magistrate to reopen the case.
Since a fresh report had been submitted by the Superintendent of Police, the District Magistrate was required to initiate the applicable procedure afresh and repeat the safeguards prescribed under Section 8. His failure to do so rendered the externment order unsustainable.
The Chhattisgarh High Court had dismissed the appellant’s writ petition on the ground that he had not exhausted the alternative statutory remedy of appeal under Section 9 of the 1990 Act.
The Supreme Court held that the High Court grossly erred in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution when the challenged order was alleged to have been passed without jurisdiction and in violation of natural justice.
According to the Bench, relegating the appellant to the statutory appellate remedy in such circumstances demonstrated an “abject failure” by the High Court to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it.
The Court clarified, does not prevent a High Court from entertaining a writ petition in recognised exceptional situations, including when natural justice has been violated or the authority has acted without jurisdiction.
Examining the externment order on merits, the Supreme Court found that the invocation of Section 5(b) of the 1990 Act was “wholly misconceived”.
Section 5(b) applies where reasonable grounds exist to believe that a person is engaged or is about to engage in an offence involving force or violence, or in specified categories of offences.
The offences relied upon by the District Magistrate did not involve force or violence and did not fall within the categories specified in Section 5(b). The allegations relating to insulting a revered religious figure corresponded to offences affecting religion rather than the categories expressly covered by the provision.
The necessary conditions for exercising power under Section 5(b) were therefore absent.
The Court also considered whether the order could be sustained under Section 5(a), which permits externment where a person’s movements or acts are causing, or are calculated to cause, alarm, danger or harm to persons or property.
While recognising that the language of Section 5(a) is broad, the Bench stressed that the breadth of the power is matched by the seriousness of its consequences.
“Merely because multiple criminal cases have been registered against a person would not, ipso facto, be a ground for ordering externment,” the Court observed.
Before passing such an order, the District Magistrate must arrive at a bona fide and informed subjective satisfaction that externment is necessary to prevent the apprehended harm. The decision must be based on objective material, and there must be a discernible connection between that material and the conclusion reached.
Although the administrative authority is not required to write an elaborate judgment, its order must broadly disclose the reasons that persuaded it to adopt such an extreme measure.
The Supreme Court found that the District Magistrate’s order did not disclose the material on which it concluded that the appellant’s conduct had generated resentment and public outrage among different communities.
The order also failed to explain why the situation was considered sufficiently grave to require the appellant’s removal from Raigarh and adjoining districts for one year.
No supporting material was placed on record to show why the alleged offences necessitated externment. This absence of objective material and cogent reasons made the order arbitrary and indefensible.
The Bench reiterated that externment is an extraordinary measure that may prevent a person from residing in their own home, living with family members and pursuing a livelihood. Such power must therefore be exercised sparingly and only in extraordinary circumstances.
The Supreme Court quashed both the Chhattisgarh High Court judgment and the District Magistrate’s externment order.
The Court declared that the appellant was free to enter Raigarh and the adjoining districts from which he had been externed.
It, however, clarified that none of its observations would be treated as findings on the merits of any pending criminal case in which the appellant figures as an accused. The appeal was accordingly allowed.
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