The Supreme Court has clarified the legal effect of ratification of an unauthorised acceptance of resignation, holding that a resignation initially accepted by an officer lacking statutory authority can nevertheless become legally valid when the competent authority subsequently ratifies that action.
The bench of Justice Alok Aradhe and Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha has observed that an employee who himself seeks an early acceptance of resignation, accepts relieving documents and consequential benefits, and acts upon the resignation cannot later seek to invalidate the exit merely on the ground of an internal defect in the authority of the officer who accepted it.
The bench noted that the appeals involved two overlapping questions: the right of an employee to withdraw a tendered resignation and the legal consequences of subsequent ratification by the competent authority of an otherwise unauthorised acceptance.
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The Delhi case concerned an Assistant Registrar (Legal) who had joined Delhi Technological University (DTU) in 2010. Under Section 23(2)(ix) of the Delhi Technological University Act, 2009, the Board of Management (BOM) was vested with the power to appoint persons to teaching, administrative and ministerial posts. The Supreme Court held that this power to appoint necessarily included the corresponding power to accept resignation from such posts.
The employee tendered his resignation on May 19, 2016, proposing that it take effect from September 1, 2016. He subsequently requested waiver of the notice period and sought acceptance of his resignation from May 31, 2016. The then Vice-Chancellor, who was holding only additional charge, accepted the resignation with effect from May 31, 2016, and the employee was relieved. His no-dues certificate, last pay certificate and experience certificate were also issued and accepted by him.
The employee subsequently sought withdrawal of his resignation on September 22, 2016, contending that the resignation had neither been accepted nor ratified by the competent authority. Four days later, however, the BOM ratified the acceptance of the resignation at its meeting held on September 26, 2016. DTU thereafter rejected the request for withdrawal.
The Delhi High Court had directed reinstatement. While the Division Bench upheld reinstatement, it denied back wages because the employee had obtained gainful employment during the intervening period. DTU challenged the reinstatement before the Supreme Court, while the employee separately challenged the denial of back wages.
The Supreme Court first agreed with the High Court on the limited question of competence. It held that the BOM was the statutory authority competent to accept the resignation. The Vice-Chancellor who accepted the resignation on May 25, 2016, was holding only additional charge and the statutory power of the BOM had not been validly delegated to him.
However, according to the Supreme Court, that conclusion did not end the matter. The crucial question was whether the subsequent ratification by the BOM cured the defect in the original acceptance.
The Court explained that ratification means subsequent confirmation or adoption by the authority competent to perform an act of an earlier act done without authority or irregularly. Once properly ratified, the law treats the act as valid from the date on which it was originally performed.
The Court relied on the established principle expressed through the maxim ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur, meaning that subsequent ratification is equivalent to prior authority. It further explained that ratification operates retrospectively and relates back to the date of the original unauthorised act.
The judgment laid down several principles governing ratification. First, ratification converts a previously invalid act into a valid one. Second, subsequent approval by the competent authority is treated as though the authority existed from the beginning. Third, ratification operates retrospectively. Fourth, only the authority legally empowered to perform the original act can ratify it.
Importantly, the Court clarified that a fresh order is not necessarily required. An express resolution or decision of the competent authority approving the earlier unauthorised action can itself constitute valid ratification. At the same time, ratification cannot cure an act that is inherently illegal or prohibited by law; it only cures the defect relating to want of authority.
The Supreme Court found an additional and significant reason why the employee could not subsequently challenge the resignation.
The Court observed that the employee himself had initiated the resignation process and then requested that the notice period be waived so that he could be relieved earlier. DTU acted upon that request, relieved him from the requested date and issued the relevant service documents, including his experience certificate.
The Court held that the resignation had effectively been “consummated” by the conduct of the parties, particularly the employee’s own conduct. The employee had accepted the consequences of his resignation and did not challenge the authority of the accepting officer until nearly four months later.
The position was further strengthened by the fact that the employee subsequently obtained employment with NIT Calicut as Deputy Registrar, relying upon the experience certificate issued by DTU. The Supreme Court held that having used the consequences of his resignation to secure another appointment, he could not later treat the resignation as legally non-existent merely because he subsequently wished to return.
The Supreme Court ultimately held that once the BOM ratified the acceptance, that ratification related back to May 25, 2016, when the resignation had originally been accepted by the in-charge Vice-Chancellor.
Consequently, when the employee attempted to withdraw his resignation on September 22, 2016, there was no subsisting resignation left to be withdrawn. The Court therefore set aside the Delhi High Court’s direction for reinstatement.
The connected Kerala case involved a different factual situation. After joining NIT Calicut as Deputy Registrar, the employee tendered his resignation in November 2018. The competent authority accepted it on November 22, 2018, while the employee was permitted to remain in service until January 11, 2019, for completion of the notice period.
The employee sought withdrawal of his resignation after being selected on deputation with the East Delhi Municipal Corporation. His request was rejected by a reasoned order, and he was ultimately relieved on January 11, 2019.
The Supreme Court rejected his challenge and clarified the distinction between the date on which resignation becomes legally effective and the date on which the employee is actually relieved.
Under Statute 30 of the NIT First Statutes, 2009, resignation takes effect on the date on which it is accepted by the appointing authority. Therefore, the resignation became legally effective on November 22, 2018. The subsequent notice period governed only the date of actual relieving and did not postpone the legal effect of acceptance.
The Court also rejected the argument that the resignation remained capable of withdrawal because acceptance had not immediately been communicated.
It held that where the competent authority has already accepted a resignation in accordance with the governing statutory framework, mere non-communication of that acceptance does not keep the resignation legally alive. In the present case, the request for withdrawal was made after the resignation had already become legally effective.
The Supreme Court further considered the employee’s reliance on the general principle permitting withdrawal of resignation before actual relieving.
The Court noted that the Office Memorandum dated February 11, 1988 recognises withdrawal of an accepted resignation before actual relieving as the normal rule but expressly permits the competent authority to refuse such withdrawal, provided reasons are recorded and communicated.
In the NIT Calicut case, the competent authority had concluded that the employee did not genuinely intend to continue in service and that his request for withdrawal arose after his selection for deputation. The Supreme Court held that this was a plausible and rational conclusion and that a court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 should not substitute its own assessment for that of the competent authority unless there is mala fide action, perversity or a demonstrated violation of law.
The Supreme Court accordingly allowed the Civil Appeal filed by Delhi Technological University, set aside the Delhi High Court judgment to the extent it directed reinstatement and dismissed the employee’s writ petition.
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