The Supreme Court has held that a public employee cannot be discharged from service merely because a criminal case is pending against him, particularly when the termination is effected without affording him an opportunity to defend himself. In a significant judgment, the Court found that the discharge of a police employee after more than a decade of service, solely on the ground of pendency of criminal proceedings, was illegal and arbitrary.

The bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu declined to order reinstatement because of serious procedural and pleading deficiencies in the civil suit, it invoked its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to direct the respondents to pay ₹5 lakh as compensation to the appellant within three months.

The litigation arose from the appellant’s service in the Punjab Police. According to the case record, he had been appointed as a Special Police Officer in Police District Batala on October 17, 1991. He was subsequently selected for appointment as a Constable in the First Indian Reserve Battalion (IRB), Patiala, by a letter dated August 27, 2002.

Buy Now: 50+ Supreme Court Judgments – July 2026

Although he reported to the Commandant, IRB, Patiala, on August 30, 2002, he was not permitted to join on account of a criminal case that was pending against him. At the relevant time, he was facing proceedings arising from FIR No. 159 dated July 20, 2001, registered under Sections 324, 326 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

The appellant was subsequently discharged from service on January 14, 2003, with reference to the pending criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court noted that this fact was admitted by the respondents themselves.

The criminal trial eventually resulted in his conviction. The trial court convicted him under Sections 324 and 326 IPC and imposed sentences of rigorous imprisonment. However, in appeal, the conviction under Section 326 IPC was set aside while the conviction under Section 324 IPC was maintained.

The appellate court also released him on probation of good conduct for two years. Importantly, the appellate court directed that the conviction should not affect his service career.

The appellant had instituted a civil suit seeking a declaration that the refusal to permit him to join as a Constable or Special Police Officer was illegal and invalid. He also sought mandatory directions for his joining and consequential service benefits.

The trial court decreed the suit on December 2, 2011. It directed the authorities to reinstate him with continuity of service and consequential benefits, although it denied him wages for the period between dismissal and reinstatement.

The State authorities challenged the decree before the District Judge, Gurdaspur. The appellate court allowed the State’s appeal on May 21, 2014 and dismissed the employee’s suit.

The employee thereafter approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court dismissed his second appeal on May 12, 2016, leading to the proceedings before the Supreme Court.

One of the principal arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant was that the order releasing him on probation specifically stated that his conviction would not affect his service career.

The appellant argued that this direction had attained finality because the respondents had not challenged it. Reliance was also placed on Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, under which a person dealt with under the probation provisions does not suffer certain statutory disqualifications attached to conviction.

The Supreme Court, however, rejected the broader interpretation sought to be placed on Section 12.

The Court held that release on probation does not obliterate or wipe out the conviction. A person released on probation cannot claim an absolute right to continue in public service merely because probation has been granted.

The Court relied upon a line of earlier Supreme Court authorities, including Southern Railway v. T.R. Chellapan, Trikha Ram v. V.K. Seth, Union of India v. Bakshi Ram, Karam Singh v. State of Punjab, DIG of Police v. P.R.K. Mohan and Sushil Kumar Singhal v. Punjab National Bank.

According to the Court, these decisions consistently establish that release on probation does not remove the conviction itself. A disciplinary authority may take appropriate action against an employee on the basis of the conviction.

The Bench specifically held that the earlier decision in Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, on which the Sessions Judge had relied, did not lay down the correct law because it had failed to notice earlier Supreme Court precedents dealing with the effect of conviction and probation.

Thus, the Supreme Court made an important distinction: probation may protect a person from certain statutory disqualifications attached to conviction, but it does not necessarily prevent service action based upon the conviction.

The Court undertook a detailed examination of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

It explained that the provision has two components. First, a person released on probation under Sections 3 or 4 should not suffer a disqualification that a law specifically attaches to the conviction. Second, the disqualification must actually be one that attaches to the conviction under that law.

The Court rejected the argument that Section 12 could be stretched to mean that probation prevents termination of the service of a convicted public employee.

The Bench observed that release on probation does not obliterate the conviction. The purpose of probation is primarily reform and rehabilitation, but that does not prevent the State from taking service-related action based on the conduct that resulted in the conviction.

The Court also referred to the constitutional framework governing public employment, particularly Article 311, and noted that the Constitution itself cannot be treated as being overridden by Section 12 of the 1958 Act.

Despite rejecting the appellant’s interpretation of Section 12, the Supreme Court found a separate and crucial defect in the State’s action.

The Court emphasised that the appellant was not discharged because he had been convicted. At the time the discharge order was passed on January 14, 2003, the criminal proceedings were still pending.

The Court found that this distinction was decisive.

The appellant had been discharged solely on the basis of the pendency of the criminal case, without being given an opportunity to put forward his defence. The subsequent conviction could not retrospectively cure the illegality in the discharge order.

The Supreme Court observed that the fact that the appellant was later convicted under Section 324 IPC could not validate an order that was illegal when it was originally passed.

The Bench made a strong observation regarding the legality of the State’s action.

It noted that the respondents had failed to show any law authorising them to dismiss or remove a police employee who had served for more than a decade solely because a criminal case was pending against him.

The Court held that the appellant was given a “raw deal” when he was discharged merely because of the pending criminal case. The fact that he was subsequently convicted could not cure the defect in the original termination.

The judgment therefore draws a clear distinction between service action following an established conviction and termination merely because criminal proceedings are pending.

Although the Court found the discharge to be unjustified, it did not order reinstatement.

The reason was that the case came before the Supreme Court through a civil suit, rather than a writ petition, and the scope of the civil court’s jurisdiction and relief was governed by the pleadings, evidence and provisions of the CPC.

The Supreme Court noted that the original order of discharge had never been directly challenged by the appellant. There was also no proper amendment of the plaint under Order VI Rule 17 CPC or application for additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC.

Further, the precise nature of the appellant’s appointment could not be conclusively ascertained because the appointment order was not available on record.

The Court also noted that reinstatement could not have been granted by the civil court in the form in which the suit had been framed, particularly in view of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

The Court observed that damages, rather than reinstatement, could have been the appropriate relief, a position that was not disputed by the appellant’s counsel.

The procedural shortcomings, however, did not persuade the Supreme Court to leave the appellant without any remedy.

The Bench posed the question whether those deficiencies could completely absolve the respondents of the consequences of their illegal and arbitrary action.

The answer was emphatically in the negative.

Exercising its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court directed the respondents to pay ₹5 lakh as compensation to the appellant within three months from the date of the judgment.

The Court stated that a higher amount could have been awarded, but the lack of information concerning certain vital aspects of the case, for which the appellant also bore some responsibility, weighed against awarding a larger sum.

The Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s claim that probation itself insulated him from service consequences flowing from conviction. Yet it simultaneously held that the State could not retrospectively use the subsequent conviction to justify an earlier discharge that had been made merely on account of the pending criminal case.

The Supreme Court accordingly disposed of the civil appeal by directing payment of ₹5 lakh compensation to the appellant within three months.

Membership Required to Access Case Details & Order Copy

To view the complete Case Details and Download Order Copy, you must have an active membership. Please subscribe to continue.

Read More: Supreme Court Acquits Man After 22 Years in Prison, Finds Eyewitness Testimony Unreliable