The Gujarat High Court has refused to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with the final findings of the Designated Authority and the consequential anti-dumping duty notification concerning imports of Sulphenamides Accelerators. Holding that the petitioner had an efficacious statutory appellate remedy under Section 9C of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, the Division Bench dismissed the writ petition while granting liberty to approach the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT).
The Bench of Justice A.S. Supehia and Justice Vaibhavi D. Nanavati has observed that Section 9C provides a comprehensive appellate mechanism enabling CESTAT to examine the legality and validity of the Final Findings as well as the notification issued under Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act.
The petitioner, a Belgium-based manufacturer of Sulphenamides Accelerators used in the manufacture of rubber products, challenged the Final Findings dated March 20, 2026, issued by the Designated Authority in Anti-Dumping Case No. AD(OI)-49/2024, as well as Notification No. 11/2026-Customs (ADD) dated June 19, 2026, imposing anti-dumping duty.
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According to the petitioner, its products conform to stringent European manufacturing and quality standards, resulting in comparatively higher export prices than products supplied by the Indian domestic industry. It argued that the anti-dumping investigation suffered from several procedural and legal infirmities, rendering the final findings unsustainable.
The Belgian exporter contended that the Designated Authority failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of the Customs Tariff (Identification, Assessment and Collection of Anti-Dumping Duty on Dumped Articles and for Determination of Injury) Rules, 1995.
One of the principal grievances was that the authority did not disclose the methodology, computations and working adopted for determining the exporter-specific dumping margin and injury margin. According to the petitioner, Rule 16 of the Anti-Dumping Rules mandates disclosure of the essential facts before recording final findings, enabling interested parties to effectively defend their case.
It was argued that the failure to disclose these calculations deprived the petitioner of a meaningful opportunity to identify factual and computational errors, thereby violating the principles of natural justice.
The petitioner also questioned the methodology adopted in determining the injury margin. It argued that under Rule 11 read with Annexures I and II to the Anti-Dumping Rules, the injury margin is calculated as the difference between the Non-Injurious Price (NIP) and the landed value of imports.
According to the petitioner, where the NIP remains constant, imports with a lower landed value should mathematically result in a higher injury margin. However, the impugned findings allegedly recommended a lower anti-dumping duty for countries with lower landed values while imposing higher duties on countries with comparatively higher landed values. This, it claimed, indicated a fundamental computational error in determining the landed value, injury margin or application of the lesser duty rule.
The petitioner further alleged that the Designated Authority failed to conduct the mandatory scrutiny under Rule 5(3) before initiating the anti-dumping investigation and initiated proceedings without adequately verifying the domestic industry’s evidence regarding dumping, injury and causal link.
To overcome the objection regarding the availability of an appellate remedy, the petitioner argued that the case fell within the well-recognized exceptions permitting invocation of writ jurisdiction despite an alternative remedy.
It relied upon the Supreme Court decisions in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks and Radha Krishna Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh, contending that the impugned proceedings were vitiated by gross violation of statutory provisions and principles of natural justice.
The Union of India and the domestic industry strongly opposed the maintainability of the writ petition.
They argued that Section 9C of the Customs Tariff Act expressly provides an appeal to CESTAT against determinations relating to dumping, injury and anti-dumping duty. Since the petitioner’s challenge essentially concerned the correctness of the injury margin and determination of anti-dumping duty, those issues fell squarely within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
The respondents also informed the Court that the Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association had already challenged the same Final Findings and notification before CESTAT, New Delhi, and any observations by the High Court could prejudice those pending proceedings.
While acknowledging that the existence of an alternative remedy does not completely bar the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226, the Bench reiterated that writ jurisdiction should ordinarily not be exercised where an effective statutory remedy exists unless exceptional circumstances are established.
After examining the disclosure statement and the record, the Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that there had been any violation of Rules 6, 7, 11, 16 or 17 of the Anti-Dumping Rules.
The Bench noted that the Designated Authority had shared all non-confidential information with interested parties, maintained confidentiality of commercially sensitive data in accordance with Rule 7 and provided adequate opportunities of hearing to all stakeholders.
The Court observed that confidential transaction-wise import data obtained from government agencies could not legally be disclosed to interested parties, and the authority had instead shared the relevant volume and price information required under the Anti-Dumping Rules.
A significant aspect of the judgment is the Court’s refusal to scrutinize the methodology adopted by the Designated Authority in determining dumping margins and injury margins.
The Bench emphasized that valuation methodology and assessment of technical economic data fall within the expertise of the Designated Authority and cannot ordinarily be examined by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
The Court observed that questions regarding the correctness of the methodology, computation of landed value, determination of Non-Injurious Price and magnitude of injury margin are matters better suited for examination by the appellate Tribunal.
The Division Bench further noted that the same Final Findings had already been challenged before CESTAT by the Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association.
In view of the pendency of those proceedings, the Court considered it inappropriate to entertain a parallel challenge under Article 226, particularly when the petitioner could pursue the same statutory remedy.
Finding no gross violation of natural justice, no breach of mandatory statutory provisions and no jurisdictional error warranting interference under Article 226, the Gujarat High Court dismissed the writ petition.
The Court clarified that the petitioner remains free to challenge both the Final Findings and the anti-dumping notification before CESTAT under Section 9C of the Customs Tariff Act.
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