The Supreme Court has ruled that injuries caused by a falling roadside tree branch cannot ordinarily be treated as a motor vehicle accident under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, even if the victim was sitting inside a vehicle at the time of the incident.
However, the bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh while invoking its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, enhanced the compensation payable to the victim to ₹25 lakh in the interest of complete justice.
The case arose from an incident that occurred on June 23, 2007. The victim was travelling in an autorickshaw from Queens Road to Chinnaswamy Stadium in Bengaluru when heavy rainfall prompted him to request the driver to stop temporarily by the roadside. While the autorickshaw was stationary beneath an old roadside tree, a branch suddenly broke off and fell on the vehicle, causing serious injuries to the passenger. He was immediately shifted to a hospital for treatment.
The injured passenger subsequently filed a compensation claim of ₹50 lakh before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT). The Tribunal dismissed the claim, holding that the incident was the result of a natural calamity. The Karnataka High Court initially dismissed the matter on the ground of delay. After intervention by the Supreme Court and remand of the case, the High Court reconsidered the matter and awarded compensation of ₹17.10 lakh. Liability was apportioned among the municipal corporation, the insurer of the autorickshaw, and the Horticulture Department of the State Government.
The Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) challenged the High Court’s decision before the Supreme Court, particularly the finding that it should bear a portion of the compensation liability.
While deciding the appeal, the Supreme Court undertook an extensive review of the legal doctrine of “Act of God” or vis major. The Court referred to several landmark English and Indian decisions dealing with natural events and liability.
The Bench observed that an Act of God generally refers to extraordinary natural events that cannot reasonably be foreseen or prevented despite the exercise of reasonable care. Events such as storms, lightning, exceptional floods, and extraordinary rainfall have traditionally been recognised as falling within this category.
The Court also noted that municipal authorities undoubtedly have a duty to maintain roadside trees and ensure public safety. However, it would be unrealistic to expect continuous monitoring of every tree and branch across an expanding city. Merely because a branch of an old tree unexpectedly falls does not automatically establish negligence on the part of municipal authorities.
A central issue before the Court was whether the accident could be said to have arisen out of the “use” of a motor vehicle, a prerequisite for compensation under Sections 165 and 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the expression “arising out of the use of a motor vehicle” has been interpreted broadly in earlier judgments. Nevertheless, the Bench held that the vehicle in the present case played no active role in causing the injury.
The Court reasoned that if the victim had been standing as a pedestrian under the same tree and the branch had fallen on him, the resulting injury would have been identical. The presence of the autorickshaw was merely incidental and not a proximate cause of the accident. Consequently, the incident lacked the necessary connection with the use of the motor vehicle required under the Motor Vehicles Act.
Accordingly, the Court held that a compensation claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act was not the appropriate legal remedy for such an occurrence.
Despite its conclusion on the legal issue, the Supreme Court expressed concern that the victim, who had suffered devastating injuries, should not be compelled to undergo another round of litigation merely to secure compensation.
The Court noted that the injured person had sustained permanent paraplegia, resulting in total disability of both lower limbs along with bladder and bowel incontinence. The Bench described the injuries as life-altering and observed that denying meaningful relief would not be consistent with the conscience of justice.
The Court further remarked that the compensation awarded by the High Court was itself inadequate and had been determined through an overly technical approach. Therefore, exercising its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice, the Supreme Court enhanced the compensation from ₹17.10 lakh to ₹25 lakh, together with interest from the date of filing of the claim petition.
While increasing the compensation amount, the Supreme Court left the High Court’s apportionment of liability untouched. The municipal corporation, insurance company, and Horticulture Department were directed to deposit their respective shares within four weeks, and the compensation was ordered to be directly credited to the victim’s bank account.
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