The Delhi District Court has dismissed a revision petition filed by the Directorate General of GST Intelligence (DGGI) against an order permitting an accused to travel abroad for Hajj pilgrimage.
The matter arose from Criminal Revision wherein the DGGI challenged an earlier order dated April 6, 2026 passed by the Ld. ACJM, Patiala House Courts. In that order, the trial court had granted permission to the respondent-accused, Shuaib Malik, to travel abroad for the purpose of performing Hajj and directed temporary release of his passport.
Aggrieved by this relief, the DGGI approached the Sessions Court seeking reversal of the order, citing concerns over the accused potentially evading legal proceedings.
The Court of Shri Saurabh Partap Singh Laler, ASJ-05, New Delhi District, after hearing arguments from both sides, dismissed the revision petition filed by the DGGI.
The Court began by addressing the threshold issue of maintainability, emphasizing that revisional jurisdiction is not unlimited. It observed that the legislature has consciously barred interference in interlocutory orders under Section 397(2) CrPC / Section 438(2) BNSS. The impugned order—granting permission to travel abroad and temporary release of passport—was held to be purely incidental and procedural, as it neither determines guilt nor finally adjudicates rights of the parties. Therefore, the revision itself was not maintainable in law.
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The Court relied on settled principles laid down by higher courts to clarify what constitutes an interlocutory order. It noted that the real test is whether the order finally determines substantive rights or merely regulates proceedings during trial. Since the travel permission order did not terminate proceedings or affect the merits of the prosecution, it squarely fell within the category of interlocutory orders, thereby attracting the statutory bar on revision.
On merits, the Court dealt extensively with the argument that the trial court had modified bail conditions imposed by a superior court. Rejecting this contention, the Court adopted a harmonious interpretation of the bail conditions. It held that the condition requiring surrender of passport stood fully complied with once the passport was deposited. That condition did not mandate permanent retention of the passport by the court. Simultaneously, another bail condition allowed the accused to travel beyond Delhi with prior permission of “the Court,” which necessarily included the trial court.
The Court further clarified that once the passport is surrendered, the trial court becomes its lawful custodian. As a natural and incidental consequence of such custody, the court retains the power to temporarily release the passport for legitimate purposes. Denying this power would lead to an absurd situation where permission to travel is granted but cannot be implemented, rendering the judicial order ineffective.
Addressing DGGI’s concerns about non-cooperation and risk of absconding, the Court noted that mere apprehension is insufficient. It stressed that no concrete material was placed on record to establish that the accused would flee or obstruct investigation. The trial court had already evaluated these concerns and imposed stringent safeguards, and such discretionary findings cannot be interfered with in revision unless shown to be perverse.
On the constitutional aspect, the Court endorsed the trial court’s reasoning that the right to travel abroad is a facet of personal liberty under Article 21, and the right to perform Hajj is protected under Article 25. Any restriction on these rights must be just, fair, and reasonable. The Court found that the trial court had struck an appropriate balance by permitting travel while imposing conditions to secure the accused’s return and ensure cooperation.
The Court also reiterated the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction, observing that it cannot act as an appellate authority to reassess facts or substitute its own discretion for that of the trial court. Interference is warranted only when the order is illegal, perverse, or results in miscarriage of justice—none of which were established in the present case.
In conclusion, the Court held that the impugned order was legally sound, reasoned, and within jurisdiction, both procedurally and substantively. The revision petition thus failed “at the gate” on maintainability and “on the field” on merits, reaffirming the principle that procedural orders facilitating liberty, when backed by safeguards, should not be lightly interfered with.
Case Details
Case Title: DGGI Vs. Shuaib Malik
Case No.: Crl. Revision No. 208/2026
Date: 24/04/2026
Counsel For Petitioner: Vertika Sharma, Ld. SSC
Counsel For Respondent: R.P. Singh, Nirmal Dixit
