This article is written by Trishla Chhangani, a law graduate (B.A. LL.B., 2025) from Jai Narain Vyas University, Jodhpur.
An Allahabad high court judge using his right to constitutional remedy asked the supreme court to protect its fundamental rights specifically right to equality and right to life under constitution of India.
A judge, faced an investigation after burnt currency notes were found in a storeroom at his official residence following a fire.
This discovery led to the suspicions that he had violated judicial ethics.
Thus the Supreme Court’s “In-house Procedure” was initiated, and a three-member committee was formed by the Chief Justice of India (CJI) to investigate the matter.
During this time, the judge was also sent to his parent High Court and was not assigned with any judicial work.
The committee’s inquiry found with sufficient evidence, further concluding that the misconduct was serious enough to warrant his removal.
Following the incident, the CJI gave the judge two option either to resign or to retire voluntarily.
However, The judge refused and requested more time to review the report and further argued that the process was fundamentally unjust.
Thereafter, the CJI informed the President and Prime Minister about the committee’s findings and requested to initiate action against the petitioner.
A writ petition was thus presented by the petitioner requesting the following relief from the Court.
The petitioner requested to declare the in-house procedure as unconstitutional.
Further requested the communication to the president and prime minister by the CJI to be declared unconstitutional and be quashed.
The committee report and subsequent actions to be quashed and set aside
Finally, any other appropriate orders the court deemed fit were requested.
ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER
The petitioner’s counsel, argued that the in-house procedure used to investigate the judge was unconstitutional and violated Articles 124 and 218 of the Constitution. Emphasizing on para 5(b) and 7(ii) of the procedure as a unconstitutional removal process.
Only through the Judges (Inquiry) Act of 1968 can a judge be removed thus the in-house procedure overstepped its bounds by interfering with Parliament’s authority.
Furthermore, a violation of due process and The principle of separation of powers were also alleged by the petitioner’s counsel.
Finally, it was contended that publishing of documents and video footage on the Supreme Court’s website had damaged the judge’s reputation and also violated the petitioner’s fundamental rights under constitution of india.
Furthermore A supplementary argument was made by another senior counsel, highlighting that the cji refused to hear the petitioner thus breaching the principle of equality.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT
The petitioner’s counsel,only focused his arguments on the constitutionality of the in-house procedure and did not mentioned anything relating to the specific inquiry conducted by the committe.
The court, however, questioned the promptness of the petition, stating that the inquiry had already been concluded and that the Chief Justice of India (CJI) had already informed the President and Prime Minister of the findings.
The court also pointed out on the non-objection of the release of footage and documents or raised any objection during the inquiry itself.
In response, The petitioner’s counsel contended hat the court should not refuse to hear the case as the challenge was based on the violation of fundamental rights, which could not be waived.
On rasing the question by the court whether the judges (protection) act,1985 was applied to the case ,which was then denied by the petitioner counsel on two main grounds
First, he argued that no existing law,has the provision that grants the Supreme Court the power to initiate such a removal process.
Second, he further claimed that if the Act were to apply, it would unconstitutionally imply that the Central or State Governments could also initiate removal proceedings.
upon hearing the petitioner counsel’s arguments , the court decided not to issue a notice to the respondents and thus reserved its judgment.
QUESTIONS.
Based on petitioner counsel’s arguments as well as the facts on record, the following substantial questions of law arised for an answer:
I. Should the writ petition be entertained at all having regard to the conduct of the Petitioner?
II. Does the PROCEDURE have legal sanction?
III. Is an inquiry and the consequent report in terms of the PROCEDURE (which could be unfavourable to the Judge under probe) a parallel and extra-constitutional mechanism?
IV. Does paragraph 5(b) of the PROCEDURE foul Article 124 and Article 125 read with Articles 217 and 218 of the Constitution or abrogate any Fundamental Right of a Judge of a High Court?
V. Did the CJI/the COMMITTEE constituted by the CJI act in terms of the PROCEDURE or in deviation thereof?
VI. Is the requirement of paragraph 7(ii) of the PROCEDURE obliging the CJI to forward the report of the Committee to the President and the Prime Minister unconstitutional?
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS WITH REASONS
Appreciating the merits of the arguments advanced on behalf of the Petitioner The Court opinion was formed that a thorough examination of the constitutional provisions for removing a High Court judge from the office , the law in terms whereof inquiry has to be held, and the genesis of the procedure, what this procedure is all about the court further evaluated the role of the CJI, and the nature and its impact on the inquiry of the judge who is under scrutiny, and also the applicability of the Judges (Protection) Act, thus by reviewing relevant legal precedents submitted by the petitioner counsel would significantly help in facilitating and aiding in answering the above questions effectively and thereby enable the court to complete the task at hand appropriately.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND THE INQUIRY ACT
In an analysis by the court a Judge of a High Court cannot be removed from office except on the ground of proved misbehaviour or proved incapacity admits of no doubt.
The provisions relatable to removal of a Judge of a High Court from office are traceable to Articles 217 and 218 of indian constitution.
The court further examined the law that is referred to in clause (5) of Article 124 is the Inquiry Act.
The Constitution itself does not prescribe the procedure for the presentation of an address and for investigation and proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge but leaves it for the Parliament to regulate the same by law.
The inquiry act provides for constitution of a committee which is to conduct an investigation/inquiry into the allegation of misbehaviour or incapacity levelled against the Judge.
The procedure enumerated in the Inquiry Act is in consonance with the principles of natural justice in that, formal charges are framed, the Judge is provided with the supporting material for each charge, opportunity is extended to cross-examine witnesses as well as to present his defence.
The committee has the same powers as that of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for summoning and enforcing the attendance of a person, examining a person on oath, requiring discovery and production of documents, receiving evidence on oath, issuing a commission for examination of witnesses or documents, and for all such other matters as may be prescribed.
It is imperative to note that if the Judge is not found guilty of any charge(s) by the committee, then the pending MOTION in the House or Houses of Parliament will not be proceeded with. Thus, it marks the end of the proceedings.
The process for impeachment of a Judge, however, is very rigid at all levels – starting with a MOTION in the House, followed by an investigation/inquiry conducted by a committee comprising of persons of high calibre, adherence to fair procedure, then the necessity of approval by a majority of the Houses and finally the approval by the President whereafter a Judge can be removed from office by impeachment.
These provisions apart, there are two other similarly worded articles in the Constitution which, though not directly related to removal of a Judge of a High Court, impose restrictions on discussions in the Parliament/State Legislatures with respect to the conduct of a Judge of a High Court. They are Articles 121 and 211.that apart from proviso (b) of clause (1) of Article 217 and Article 218 read with clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124, there is no other provision in the Constitution relating to removal of a Judge of a High Court from his office.
The court further stated that Article 121 even bars the Parliament to discuss the conduct of a Judge of a High Court except in the stated situation. Similar is the restriction imposed by Article 211.
Parliament took 18 years to pass the inquiry act as the framers believed that such situation would be rare and would not require the disciplinary measure.
Overtime because of the cumbersome impeachment process few judges might have escaped the scrutiny though some faced the disciplinary measures out of the four incidents none resulted in removal as they resigned before the proceedings concluded.
In 1990’s landmark judgment arising from the resignation of a Bombay High Court chief justice laid the foundation of in house procedure.
THE PROCEDURE – ITS GENESIS AND CONTENTS
The “In-house Procedure,” which was officially adopted by the Full Court of the Supreme Court on December 15, 1999, was an internal mechanism to address the complaints of misconduct or incapcity of judges.
This procedure was developed in C. Ravichandran Iyer case and is referenced in Additional District and Sessions Judge ‘X’ v. Registrar General, High Court of Madhya Pradesh.
Through this mechanism Complaints can be submitted to the Chief Justice of India (CJI), a High Court Chief Justice, or can be forwarded by the President, and must be documented with verifiable allegations.
And if there is a necessity to investigate more thoroughly then the CJI will appoint a three member committee comprising of senior judges adhering to principles of natural justice and without the involvement of legal representatives and examination of witnesses.
On the basis of the committee’s report the CJI can either dismiss the case if nothing is found or can recommend the judge either to resign or to retire voluntarily in serious misconduct the CJI can also inform the president and prime minister and withdraw the judges duties on its denial.
And in cases of less severe misconduct the CJI can recommend to counsel the judge and document the report accordingly.
PRECEDENTS
A series of landmark judgments shaped the understanding and application of the in house procedure-addressing complaint against judges.
In the case of sub-committee the court held that a judge cannot be restrained from performing its judicial duties unless its misconduct is proven under article 121 and 124 of the constitution.
In the case of C. Ravichandran Iyer, the court emphasised the role of CJI and recommended the self-regulatory in house mechanism to fill the gap between misbehavior and misconduct.
Further in Indira Jaising case it was stated that the committee reports under this procedure are confidential and solely for, CJI’s satisfaction as the CJI’S authority in this matter is moral rather than legal.
In P.D. Dinakaran it was highlighted delaying objection in procedural irregularity leads to waiver of rights.
Before making a final decision, the court decided to look into a few more relevant issues to ensure a complete analysis.
ROLE OF THE CJI
The court analysed the role of CJI and regarded The CJI as “first among equals,” was recognized to have a crucial moral duty to maintain the integrity of the judiciary, even without direct control over other judges.
The petitioner contested the CJI’s suggestion to begin removal proceedings, claiming it would bias Parliament and breach the separation of powers.
However, the court made several important distinctions and observations.
It clarified that the main aim of sending a report to the President and Prime Minister was to explain the withdrawal of judicial duties from the judge, which is different from a formal impeachment suggestion.
The court also dismissed the idea of the CJI being a “mere post office,” asserting that the CJI was not only entitled but required to consider the matter and send the report with their own opinions if serious misconduct was identified.
The court found no justification to limit the CJI from sharing their views.
Additionally, the court pointed out that the President was familiar with the judiciary due to their role in appointing judges, making it reasonable for the CJI to give a detailed response to complaints often directed through the President’s office.
The court rejected the claim that the CJI’s opinion would improperly sway Members of Parliament, highlighting that the Judges (Inquiry) Act established a separate, legal process for impeachment and that the in-house report, being “preliminary in nature,” could not affect this formal procedure.
In conclusion, the court emphasized that while the CJI led the institution, their actions must strictly follow the in-house procedure.
THE JUDGES (PROTECTION) ACT
Section 3(1) of the Act, which grants immunity from civil or criminal actions for official acts, was noted to be subject to Section 3(2).
section 3(2) of the act preserves the supreme court’s authority to act against the High Court judges through the In-house Procedure with its non-obstante clause the inclusion of govt in the section only includes lower judicial and quasi judicial bodies and not the higher courts.
Thus the court rejected the petitioner claim that there is no law which empowers such action.
The Act was held to complement, not undermine, the constitutional scheme Emphasising judicial accountability alongside independence.
The court declared the in house procedure as a non-statutory but wholly legal mechanism essential for maintaining integrity clarity and public trust in the judiciary.
THE NATURE OF INQUIRY UNDER THE PROCEDURE
the court clarified that the in house procedure is not a guilt determining process but is similar to a pre-disciplinary probe to asses whether a full inquiry is required this procedure is known as fact-finding preliminary inquiry.
After the constitution of the committee by CJI, it follows the principle of natural justices and does not allow cross-examination and legal representatives.
Though the judge must be heard allegations lack evidence, or serious misconduct exists warranting removal proceedings, or there is misconduct but is not grave enough for removal.
In this case though the committee found serious misconduct meriting removal proceedings.
The court further clarified that this procedure is only to assist the CJI to justify the removal which requires full inquiry act process.
The lack of full procedural safeguards in the In-house Procedure does not prejudice the judge, as its findings are provisional the court therefore held that the inquiry here was preliminary and complied with the principle of natural justice.
WHY IS THE DECISION IN SUB-COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY (SUPRA) NOT APPLICABLE?
The court rejected the counsel’s reliance on the case of sub-committee holding it inapplicable as the case dealt with materially different issues. Agreed with the development of in house procedure in the case of C. Ravichandran Iyer. This action clarifies that that the sub-committee ruling was not applicable in the C. Ravichandran Iyer case.
The ruling also did not considered the judges (protection) act, which was relevant to this case.
The court clarified that the constitutional silence does does not mean to prohibit the mechanism but provide space for judicial innovation.
Thus it does not limit the CJI from maintaining internal judicial discipline and institutional integrity.
ANSWERS
ANSWER TO QUESTION (I)
The court focused on the maintainability of the writ petition ,given the petitioner’s conduct.
It was noted that the petitioner never objected on the release of documents and footage on the website and participated in the inquiry.
The petitioner only challenged after the CJI sent the inquiry report and the response to the president and prime minister.
When asked for the delay the petitioner had no answer to it.
The court rejected the argument that approaching the court earlier would have been pointless noting that in certain cases like when a law’s validity is questioned or when there is no jurisdiction courts can intervene even before proceedings conclude.
Although the petitioner claimed that the release of the documents damaged his reputation but the court rejected stating that at the time of inquiry no objection was raised and thus once the inquiry is concluded irreversible, and could not undo the findings of misconduct. Thus the petitioner cannot claim the inquiry to be invalid.
On the whole the court found the reasoning to be unconvincing and not in good faith but still decided to hear other legal issues instead of rejecting the petition out rightly.
ANSWER TO QUESTIONS (II) AND (III)
The Court rejected the claim that the In-house Procedure lacks legal sanction, as it gained legal authority through the precedent set in C. Ravichandran Iyer and is binding under article 141.
further section3(2) of inquiry act allows action broad enough to cover such internal inquiries including in house procedures etc.
The Court clarified that the procedure does not replace the constitutional process for removing the judge.
Since the In-house Procedure is only a fact-finding and advisory mechanism, not a removal process, it is neither extra-constitutional nor a parallel system.
ANSWER TO QUESTION (IV)
the court held that the para 5(b) of the in house procedure does not conflict with the constitutional procedure for removal of judges under article 124 nor does it violated fundamental rights specifically article 21 and article 14.
This has been further affirmed in multiple precedents since C. Ravichandran Iyer. thus the procedure is fair just and consist with judicial independence.
The court further stated that If a complaint of misconduct committed by a Judge is received and if at an inquiry conducted under the PROCEDURE the allegations against such a Judge are found to have sufficient substance, he cannot claim any immunity – either by citing abrogation of his Fundamental Rights or breach of the constitutional scheme for removal of a Judge by initiating proceedings for impeachment – that his conduct is not open to be commented upon by the Committee or even by the CJI.
ANSWER TO QUESTION (V)
The Court reviewed all stages of the proceedings and found no deviation from the Procedure by the CJI or the Committee, except for the uploading of photographs and videos, which was not authorised by the Procedure.
Relying on Indira Jaising, the Court stressed that in-house inquiries were confidential, aimed at ascertaining the truth, and that demands for transparency must yield to confidentiality in such matters.
Although the uploading was improper, the petitioner’s failure to object in time meant nothing turned on it.
Answer to Question (VI)
The Court held that the CJI, as head of the judiciary, had a moral, ethical, and legal duty to act to protect institutional integrity, and could not be expected to wait for Parliament to initiate action.
Given the President’s role as appointing authority and the Prime Minister’s constitutional position, paragraph 7(ii) of the Procedure, requiring the CJI to forward the Committee’s report to them, was valid.
Even if the CJI had endorsed the Committee’s findings and recommended removal, this could not be challenged on legal grounds, as such communications were confidential and directed solely to the President and Prime Minister.
The Court also rejected the argument that a hearing was required after the judge declined to resign or retire, as the Procedure imposed no such obligation.
CONCLUSION
The court dismissed the writ petition stands dismissed.
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Amit Sharma is the Content Editor at JurisHour. He has been writing about the Indian legal market. He has covered tax & company litigation stories from the Supreme Court, High Courts and Various Tribunals. Amit graduated from MLSU Law College with B.A.LL.B. and also holds an LL.M. from MLSU, Udaipur, Rajasthan. An Advocate in Taxation, and practised in Tribunals as well as Rajasthan High Court and pursued Masters in Constitutional Law. He started out small with little resources but a big plan to take tax legal education to the remotest locations across India and eventually to the world. His vision is to make tax related legal developments accessible to the masses.
