The Supreme Court has held that rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 does not, by itself, bar the subsequent registration of an FIR based on the same or substantially similar allegations.
The bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria clarified that an order under Section 156(3) is concerned with whether the police should be directed to investigate and does not amount to an adjudication on the merits of the allegations.
The case originated from allegations that the appellant had represented himself as having influence in the Directorate of Education, Prayagraj, and could secure appointments to the post of Clerk for the complainant’s son and grandson in return for ₹20 lakh.
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According to the complaint, the complainant transferred several amounts to the appellant’s bank account, including ₹50,000 on January 12, 2023, ₹25,000 on January 13, 2023, ₹50,000 on January 16, 2023 and ₹50,000 on January 17, 2023. The complainant alleged that no interview for the promised appointments was ultimately conducted.
The complainant further alleged that when he later sought an explanation and demanded return of the money, the appellant abused and threatened him and his family members. Bank statements and a purported Directorate of Education result were also furnished to the police in support of the allegations.
On the basis of the allegations, FIR No. 405 of 2024 was registered for offences under Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 504 and 506 of the IPC.
An important procedural feature of the case was that the complainant had earlier approached the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Prayagraj under Section 156(3) CrPC seeking registration of an FIR.
Before deciding that application, the Magistrate obtained a report from the Police Crime Branch. The report treated the dispute as one relating to a land transaction, whereas the complainant’s application alleged that money had been paid for securing public employment.
Taking note of the inconsistency between the police report and the complainant’s version, the Magistrate rejected the Section 156(3) application on September 11, 2024. The revision against that order was also dismissed.
A subsequent FIR was nevertheless registered on the basis of the complaint. The appellant therefore approached the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 seeking quashing of the FIR and consequential proceedings.
The High Court declined to interfere, observing that rejection of the earlier Section 156(3) application did not constitute a bar to registration of an FIR where the subsequent information disclosed cognizable offences. It also held that the appellant’s defence concerning the actual nature of the monetary transactions was a matter for investigation.
Before the Supreme Court, the principal question was whether rejection of an application under Section 156(3) CrPC, founded on substantially the same allegations, prevented the subsequent registration of an FIR and continuation of criminal proceedings.
The Court examined the statutory scheme governing Sections 154, 156(3) and 190 CrPC. It explained that Section 154 provides the ordinary mechanism for setting criminal law in motion when information discloses a cognizable offence, while Section 156(3) enables a Magistrate to direct investigation where the police have failed or refused to act.
The Court emphasised that Section 156(3) is essentially a mechanism to ensure that the statutory power of investigation is exercised by the police. An order under the provision does not amount to the Magistrate conducting an adjudication on the truth or merits of the allegations.
The Supreme Court’s central finding was that an order rejecting a Section 156(3) application does not possess the character of a final adjudication on the merits.
The Court held that such an order merely declines to direct the police to exercise their investigative powers. It does not determine the rights or liabilities of the proposed accused and does not constitute a final finding on whether the allegations are true or false.
Consequently, the rejection of a Section 156(3) application cannot automatically attract the doctrine of res judicata so as to prevent a subsequent FIR based on the same or substantially similar allegations.
The ruling is significant because it distinguishes between an order concerning the commencement or direction of investigation and a judicial determination following adjudication on the merits.
The Court extensively considered its earlier decisions dealing with the application of res judicata in criminal proceedings.
It referred to decisions including Pritam Singh, Bhagat Ram and State of Rajasthan v. Tarachand Jain, which recognised the relevance of finality principles in criminal proceedings, as well as later decisions such as Devendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Muskan Enterprises, where res judicata had been held inapplicable in particular circumstances involving successive Section 482 petitions.
The Supreme Court explained that there was no real conflict between these lines of authority because the procedural settings were materially different.
Where an earlier criminal proceeding has culminated in a final adjudication on the merits, the doctrine of res judicata may have application. On the other hand, where there has been no final adjudication on merits, such as in certain quashing proceedings, the doctrine does not operate in the same manner.
Applying that distinction to Section 156(3), the Court concluded that rejection of such an application is not a final adjudication and therefore cannot prevent subsequent criminal proceedings merely because substantially similar allegations are involved.
The Supreme Court further stressed that the police’s statutory obligation under Section 154 CrPC does not arise only because a Magistrate has issued an order under Section 156(3).
Relying upon the Constitution Bench decision in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, the Court observed that where information furnished to the police discloses a cognizable offence, registration of an FIR is mandatory. At the registration stage, the police are not required to determine the truthfulness or evidentiary strength of the allegations. Those matters fall within the investigation.
The Court therefore held that rejection of an earlier Section 156(3) application cannot extinguish or curtail the police’s independent statutory obligation where subsequent information discloses a cognizable offence.
The Court also relied upon its earlier decision in Mahendri v. State of U.P., where it had held that declining a Section 156(3) request does not determine the merits of the controversy or establish the falsity of allegations contained in a subsequently lodged FIR.
According to the Supreme Court, this approach is consistent with the statutory structure because Section 156(3) is directed towards the investigative process rather than adjudication of the underlying dispute.
The Court thus rejected the argument that the earlier Magistrate’s order, even though affirmed in revision, created an absolute procedural bar against the later FIR.
The appellant had relied upon the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mohan Karthik v. State of Tamil Nadu, arguing that a second round of proceedings under Section 156(3) was impermissible after rejection of the first application.
The Supreme Court, however, found that the issue in Mohan Karthik was materially different. That case concerned a second application under Section 156(3) itself and the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to entertain such a second application.
The present case, by contrast, concerned the independent power and duty of the police to register an FIR upon receiving information disclosing a cognizable offence after an earlier Section 156(3) application had been rejected. The Court therefore held that Mohan Karthik had no application to the controversy before it.
Having answered the Section 156(3) issue, the Supreme Court turned to the question of whether the FIR itself should be quashed.
The Court reiterated the established principle governing exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC: at the FIR-quashing stage, the Court must examine whether the allegations, taken at face value and accepted in their entirety, disclose a cognizable offence.
It cannot ordinarily undertake a detailed assessment of the reliability, correctness or probative value of the evidence at that preliminary stage.
In the present matter, the FIR alleged that money had been obtained on the representation that government employment could be secured, that amounts were received in the appellant’s bank account, that forged admit cards and examination results were supplied, and that threats were allegedly issued when repayment was demanded.
The Court held that, if those allegations were accepted at face value, they unquestionably disclosed cognizable offences warranting investigation.
The Supreme Court declined to examine competing versions concerning the monetary transactions at the threshold.
The appellant had relied upon the earlier police report, the alleged nature of the parties’ property dealings, bank transactions, audio recordings, admit cards and other documents. The Court held that assessing the evidentiary worth of such material would effectively require an evaluation of evidence, which is not appropriate while deciding a petition for quashing the FIR.
Whether the money related to a land transaction or was paid for securing government employment, and whether the documents and recordings relied upon by the prosecution were genuine and reliable, were matters to be investigated and, where necessary, tested during trial.
The Supreme Court did not treat this circumstance as a substitute for proof of the allegations. Rather, it noted the circumstance while considering whether the allegations in the present FIR, taken at face value, disclosed cognizable offences requiring investigation.
The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal appeal as without merit.
The Court therefore allowed the FIR and consequential proceedings to continue, leaving the disputed factual and evidentiary issues to be examined through the appropriate investigative and trial process.
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