The Supreme Court has held that the drastic step of striking off a tenant’s defence under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) cannot be applied mechanically merely because there has been a default in depositing rent.
Emphasising that procedural laws exist to advance justice rather than defeat it, the bench of Justice S.V.N. Bhatti and Justice Prasanna B. Varale set aside the Allahabad High Court’s orders and remanded the matter back to the Trial Court for fresh consideration.
The dispute arose between landlords Dharmendra Kalra and others and tenant Kulvinder Singh Bhatia concerning a property in Kaushalpuri, Kanpur Nagar, where the tenant was operating “Gyan Vaisnav Hotel.” According to the landlords, the monthly rent had been revised to ₹25,000 in September 2020, which the tenant paid for September and October 2020 but allegedly stopped paying thereafter. The landlords claimed that rent from November 2020 to June 2021 remained unpaid, resulting in arrears and ultimately leading to termination of tenancy through a legal notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Subsequently, the landlords filed an eviction suit and sought recovery of arrears. During the proceedings, the tenant initially faced ex parte proceedings but later succeeded in getting those proceedings recalled. Thereafter, the landlords moved an application under Order XV Rule 5 CPC seeking to strike off the tenant’s defence on the ground that the tenant had failed to deposit rent and other amounts in accordance with statutory requirements.
The Trial Court accepted the landlords’ plea and struck off the tenant’s defence. The Court noted that the tenant had accepted the plaintiffs as co-owners and landlords and had failed to comply with mandatory deposit obligations within prescribed timelines. However, the Allahabad High Court later intervened and allowed the tenant another opportunity to deposit rent, directing that if future defaults occurred, the defence would stand struck off. Subsequently, despite a delay in payment, the High Court further extended time for deposit after considering the tenant’s explanation that his local counsel had gone abroad.
The landlords challenged the High Court’s approach before the Supreme Court, arguing that once the High Court had imposed a final deadline, it could not later extend the same. They also contended that the tenant’s conduct demonstrated repeated defaults and deliberate attempts to delay proceedings. The tenant, on the other hand, argued that the delay was only seven days, occurred due to bona fide circumstances, and that striking off the defence was an excessively harsh consequence.
Examining the issue, the Supreme Court revisited earlier judgments concerning Order XV Rule 5 CPC. The Court observed that although the provision appears mandatory in language, it nevertheless contains an element of judicial discretion. Relying on Bimal Chand Jain v. Sri Gopal Agarwal, the Court reiterated that striking off a defence amounts to a penalty and should not be exercised routinely. The Court emphasised that a judge has discretion to assess whether there was substantial compliance or whether valid reasons existed for default.
The Bench also relied upon Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash, observing that striking out a tenant’s defence is an extreme step meant only for situations involving wilful or deliberate disregard of obligations. According to the Court, the “last resort cannot become the first resort,” and courts must distinguish between intentional non-compliance and genuine lapses.
A significant aspect examined by the Court related to the meaning of the expression “first date of hearing.” The Court observed that the Trial Court had failed to adequately determine this foundational issue. Referring to Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui v. Prem Nath Kapoor, the Court clarified that the “first date of hearing” is not simply a procedural date but rather the stage when the court applies its mind to the issues in controversy and ordinarily proceeds towards framing issues.
The Supreme Court further reiterated the principle that procedural law serves as the “handmaid of justice.” Citing Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India, the Bench observed that procedural provisions should be interpreted in a manner that advances justice rather than frustrates it.
At the same time, the Court did not completely overlook the tenant’s conduct. It noted that repeated opportunities had been granted and timelines had not been strictly adhered to. However, the Court found that the delay was not entirely unexplained or gross enough to automatically justify the severe consequence of striking off the defence.
The Supreme Court concluded that both the Trial Court and the High Court had failed to comprehensively address all relevant aspects. While the Trial Court had acted somewhat mechanically in imposing a penal consequence, the High Court had failed to adequately reconcile its conditional order with its later extension of time.
Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matter back to the Trial Court. The Trial Court has now been directed to determine the actual “first date of hearing,” examine whether substantial compliance occurred, assess whether any default was wilful or bona fide, and pass a fresh reasoned order after hearing both sides. The matter has been directed to be decided preferably within six months.
Case Details
Case Title: Dharmendra Kalra & Ors. Versus Kulvinder Singh Bhatia
Citation: JURISHOUR-1366-SC-2026
Case No.: Special Leave Petition (C) No. 7116 Of 2025
Date: 15/05/2026
