Punishment Includes Power To Forgive | Contempt Powers Not Meant To Shield Judges Or Silence Criticism: SC

The Supreme Court held that contempt powers are not meant to shield judges or silence criticism, stressing that punishment includes the power to forgive. The bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta set aside a Bombay High Court judgment that had sentenced a former housing society director to one week’s simple imprisonment for criminal contempt. The bench held that once a contemnor shows genuine remorse, the judiciary is empowered—and expected— to consider remission of punishment under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The contempt proceedings originated from a circular issued on 29 January 2025 by Vineeta Srinandan, who was then serving as the Director (Cultural) of Seawoods Estates Ltd., a large residential society in Navi Mumbai. The society was already involved in litigation before the Bombay High Court through a writ petition challenging the vires of Rule 20 of the Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023, a provision dealing with community animals and feeding zones. During the pendency of this writ petition, an intervenor, Ms. Leela Verma, submitted an affidavit drawing the Court’s attention to a circular that Srinandan had circulated to residents. In this circular, Srinandan made several sweeping and aggressive allegations against the judiciary. She asserted that a “dog feeders’ mafia” had infiltrated the judicial system and suggested that judges were unwilling to consider evidence of dog attacks submitted by housing societies. She even alleged that judges held views aligned with animal feeders and claimed that certain judicial orders disregarded human safety, thereby implying systemic bias. The circular further suggested that courts were unwilling to take cognisance of videos and photographs submitted by the society showing dog attacks, and even accused a High Court judge of trivialising such evidence. The Bombay High Court, upon reading the content of the circular, found the language and allegations to be prima facie contemptuous. On 4 February 2025, the Court directed that a notice be issued to Srinandan, seeking clarification on whether the circular was issued in her personal capacity or on behalf of the Board of Directors of Seawoods Estates Ltd. Soon thereafter, the society submitted an affidavit clarifying that the Board had no knowledge of the circular, had never authorised its issuance, and did not endorse its contents. This established that the circular had been circulated solely by Srinandan on her own. Following this, on 7 February 2025, the High Court issued a formal show-cause notice to Srinandan asking why criminal contempt proceedings should not be initiated against her. In response, she filed an affidavit accepting responsibility, expressing remorse for her action, and explaining that she had acted under mental pressure from residents concerned about stray dog incidents. She further stated that, in repentance, she had resigned from her position on the Board of Directors. Despite this, the High Court proceeded to initiate suo motu criminal contempt proceedings, ultimately finding her guilty and sentencing her to one week’s simple imprisonment along with a fine of ₹2,000. Reversing the Bombay High Court’s order, the Supreme Court held that Vineeta Srinandan’s apology was unconditional, timely, and bona fide. The Court observed that she had tendered her apology at the earliest possible opportunity, openly acknowledged her mistake, and even resigned from her position on the Board of Directors as an act of atonement. There was nothing in the record, the Court said, to suggest that her remorse was insincere or mechanical. The Bench further emphasised the statutory framework under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, noting that the provision does not merely prescribe punishment but also expressly empowers courts to discharge a contemnor or remit the punishment if a genuine apology is offered. Importantly, the Explanation clarifies that even a qualified or conditional apology may be accepted if made in good faith. In Srinandan’s case, the Supreme Court found that her apology clearly met this threshold, and hence, the High Court ought not to have rejected it. The Court also held that the High Court had relied on inapplicable precedents. Many of the judgments cited by the High Court involved circumstances where contemnors had either never apologised, had withdrawn their apologies, or had made allegations of a far more serious nature—for instance, public accusations that a sitting judge had accepted bribes. Since the factual situation in those cases was materially different, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court’s reliance on them was misplaced. The Supreme Court reiterated that the power of contempt is not meant to serve as a shield for judicial ego. The judgment opened with a powerful reminder that the authority to punish for contempt inherently includes the power to forgive, and that courts must remain conscious that contempt jurisdiction is neither a personal weapon for judges nor a tool to suppress criticism. Ultimately, the Supreme Court set aside the sentence imposed on Srinandan. While it agreed that the circular she issued indeed amounted to criminal contempt, it held that the High Court should have exercised its statutory discretion to accept her apology and remit the punishment. The appeal was therefore allowed. Case Details Case Title: Vineeta Srinandan Versus High Court Of Judicature At Bombay On Its Own Motion Case No.: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2267 OF 2025 Date: 10/12/2025 Click Here To Read Order Read More: March 31, 2026 Is the Final Cut-Off for Correcting TDS/TCS Returns for FY 2018-19 to FY 2023-24

Punishment Includes Power To Forgive | Contempt Powers Not Meant To Shield Judges Or Silence Criticism: SC

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