The Supreme Court has held that Haryana’s 2008 Premature Release Policy, framed under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), cannot supersede the State’s 2002 Remission Policy issued under the Governor’s constitutional powers under Article 161 of the Constitution. 

The bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh ruled that life convicts entitled to consideration under the 2002 constitutional policy cannot be denied its benefit merely because a subsequent statutory policy came into force. 

The appellant was convicted in 2009 for the murder of a 12-year-old child in Haryana. He was sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC, along with additional sentences under Sections 365 and 201 IPC. Although the conviction under Section 365 IPC was later set aside by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, his conviction for murder attained finality after the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal in 2015. 

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After completing approximately 14 years of actual imprisonment, the convict applied in May 2022 for premature release under Haryana’s 2002 remission policy. When no decision was taken, he approached the High Court, which directed the authorities to consider his representation.

The State eventually rejected the application, holding that the appellant was governed by the 2008 Premature Release Policy, not the 2002 policy; and he had not completed the minimum period of imprisonment prescribed under the 2008 policy, which required 20 years of actual imprisonment and 25 years of total sentence. 

This rejection ultimately reached the Supreme Court.

The principal question before the Supreme Court was: Whether Haryana’s 2002 remission policy framed under Article 161 of the Constitution continued to govern eligible convicts, or whether it stood superseded by the 2008 policy framed under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Court undertook an extensive examination of Haryana’s remission policies dating back to the 1970s.

It noted that the 1993, 2000, and 2002 policies specifically contemplated placing remission cases before the Governor of Haryana for orders under Article 161 of the Constitution.

In contrast, the 2008 policy expressly stated that remission proposals would be placed before the Chief Minister for orders under Section 432 CrPC, making it a statutory policy rather than an exercise of constitutional power. The Court also reproduced comparative tables demonstrating the structural differences between the two policies. 

The Bench emphasized that Article 161 confers an independent constitutional power upon the Governor to grant pardon, remission or commutation.

According to the Court, such constitutional authority cannot be overridden by an executive or statutory policy framed under the Criminal Procedure Code.

The judgment observed: “A statutory policy… cannot override an exercise of power under Article 161, for that power is distinct and independent, uninfluenced by any other power, more so statutory in nature.” 

The Court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s earlier three-Judge Bench judgment in State of Haryana v. Jagdish (2010). In Jagdish, the Supreme Court had already held that the 1993 Haryana remission policy was issued under Article 161; the 2008 policy was merely statutory under the CrPC; and a statutory remission policy cannot dilute or override constitutional powers.

The Court found that the 2002 policy was materially identical to the 1993 policy because both required remission cases to be placed before the Governor under Article 161. Consequently, the same constitutional character had to be attributed to the 2002 policy as well. 

One of the most significant aspects of the judgment is the Court’s treatment of the earlier decision in State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar (2021). The Bench observed that Raj Kumar had treated the 2002 remission policy as a statutory policy traceable to the CrPC.

However, according to the present Bench, that conclusion directly conflicted with the larger Bench ruling in Jagdish, which had already recognised similar remission policies as constitutional in nature.

The Court held that the reasoning adopted in Raj Kumar was per incuriam, since it overlooked the binding ratio laid down by the larger Bench.

Having concluded that the 2002 policy derives its authority from Article 161, the Court held that it could not have been superseded merely because the 2008 statutory policy declared itself to be in supersession of earlier policies.

The Bench observed that the constitutional remission power exercised through the Governor survives independently of statutory remission powers exercised under the CrPC.

As a result, the appellant remained entitled to consideration under the more beneficial 2002 policy. 

The Court directed the Haryana Government to reconsider the appellant’s remission application under the 2002 constitutional policy; take an appropriate decision within four weeks; and treat the judgment as operating prospectively, so that already-decided remission cases would not be reopened.

The Court further clarified that, following the judgment, Haryana would effectively have two distinct remission policies operating simultaneously—one flowing from the Governor’s constitutional power under Article 161 and another under the statutory framework of the CrPC. The State was left free to determine how it would proceed administratively in light of this legal position. 

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