The Delhi High Court has held that delay in filing an appeal against a Customs advance ruling cannot be condoned beyond the additional 30-day period permitted under Section 28KA of the Customs Act, 1962. The provision prescribes an initial limitation period of 60 days from communication of the ruling or order.
The Bench of Justice Avneesh Jhingan and Justice Shail Jain dismissed two appeals filed by the Customs Department against advance rulings concerning the classification of provisionally preserved areca nuts. The appeals carried a delay of 81 days beyond the prescribed 60-day period, exceeding the statutory limit for condonation.
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The proceedings arose from advance rulings concerning the classification of provisionally preserved areca nuts, both whole and split, under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
The court recorded that the Customs Authority for Advance Rulings (CAAR), through its ruling dated December 23, 2024, classified the goods under Customs Tariff Heading 0812, sub-heading 08129090, of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act.
The Customs Department challenged the ruling before the High Court under Section 28KA. The appeals were accompanied by applications seeking condonation of an 81-day delay beyond the ordinary limitation period.
Since both appeals involved common questions of law and fact, the Bench decided them through a common order.
As reproduced in the judgment, Section 28KA permits an officer authorised by the Board, or the applicant, to appeal to the High Court against a ruling or order passed by the Authority within 60 days from its communication.
The proviso empowers the High Court to allow a further period of 30 days where sufficient cause prevented the appellant from presenting the appeal within the initial period.
The Bench held that this language restricts the court’s power to condone delay. The additional 30 days are available upon sufficient cause being established; they do not confer an unrestricted discretion to extend the filing deadline.
The Department’s appeals, delayed by 81 days beyond the initial 60-day period, were therefore outside the permissible extension.
Customs Department Invoked Section 5 Of Limitation Act
The Customs Department relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Superintending Engineer/Dehar Power House Circle Bhakra Beas Management Board (PW) Slapper and Another v. Excise and Taxation Officer, Sunder Nagar/Assessing Authority, (2020) 17 SCC 692.
It argued that Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be applied to condone delay beyond the additional 30 days mentioned in Section 28KA.
The respondents raised a preliminary objection, contending that the High Court lacked the power to condone such delay. They relied on the statutory proviso and decisions including Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India (P) Ltd., and the Delhi High Court’s ruling in Commissioner of Customs (Import), Air Cargo Complex, New Delhi v. Amazon Sellers Services Pvt. Ltd.
Rejecting the Department’s submission, the Bench held that the language of the proviso to Section 28KA was unambiguous.
The court explained that, in view of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the applicability of Section 5 stood excluded. Consequently, the specific limitation framework under Section 28KA governed the power to condone delay.
The High Court could condone delay only up to 30 days beyond the prescribed 60-day period. Since the Department sought condonation of an 81-day delay beyond that initial period, the court could not entertain the appeals.
The Bench referred to several Supreme Court judgments addressing special enactments that prescribe both a limitation period and a restricted extension.
In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department, (2008) 7 SCC 169, the Supreme Court explained that where a special statute prescribes a limitation period and permits extension only up to a specified limit, that statutory scheme prevails to the extent that it excludes the Limitation Act.
The High Court also relied on Singh Enterprises v. CCE, (2008) 3 SCC 70. That decision recognised that an appellate authority cannot condone delay beyond the period permitted by the governing statute.
Further reliance was placed on Hongo India, (2009) 5 SCC 791, and Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2010) 5 SCC 23. These decisions supported the conclusion that a statutory outer limit cannot be enlarged through the general power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
The High Court distinguished the Department’s reliance on Superintending Engineer by examining the statutory provision considered in that case.
That judgment concerned Section 48 of the Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005, which prescribed 90 days for seeking revision before the High Court.
The Bench explained that the power to condone delay under that provision was not circumscribed in the same manner as Section 28KA of the Customs Act.
Section 28KA expressly permits only a further 30 days beyond the initial 60-day period. Accordingly, the VAT decision could not support an extension beyond the limit fixed under the Customs Act.
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