The Madras High Court has held that the date on which an assessment order is pronounced or issued has to be excluded while computing the limitation period for filing an appeal. 

The bench of Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy observed that even though the Limitation Act, 1963 may not apply per se to proceedings before quasi-judicial authorities, the principles underlying its limitation provisions can nevertheless be applied.

The petitioner, a government contractor, had faced an assessment order dated April 30, 2024. The assessment order was subsequently carried in appeal on August 30, 2024.

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However, the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Hosur Division, rejected the appeal exclusively on the ground that it was filed beyond the prescribed limitation period. The petitioner therefore approached the Madras High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the appellate order dated June 29, 2026. 

The petitioner contended that the appeal fell within the condonable period if the date of issuance of the assessment order was excluded while calculating the limitation period.

The principal question before the Court was whether the date of the assessment order itself should be counted while calculating the limitation period for filing the appeal.

The assessment order was dated April 30, 2024, while the appeal was presented on August 30, 2024. The High Court examined the principle contained in Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, under which the date of pronouncement of the judgment or order against which an appeal is preferred is excluded while computing limitation. 

The Court made an important clarification regarding the application of the Limitation Act to proceedings before quasi-judicial authorities.

Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy observed that although the Limitation Act does not apply per se to proceedings before such authorities, the principles underlying Section 12(2) have been held to be applicable.

Consequently, the appellate authority ought not to have rejected the appeal outright without considering whether the petitioner had shown reasonable cause for the delay. 

The ruling thus focuses not merely on the computation of limitation but also on the obligation of an appellate authority to properly consider a request for condonation where the appeal falls within the period in which delay can legally be condoned.

Finding that the appellate authority had failed to undertake this exercise, the High Court set aside the appellate order.

The Court directed the matter to be reconsidered by the appellate authority. The petitioner was permitted to lodge an application seeking condonation of delay, following which the appellate authority was directed to receive and dispose of both the condonation application and the appeal. 

Importantly, the Court directed that the appeal should be treated as having been filed on August 30, 2024, thereby preserving the date on which the petitioner had actually presented the appeal. 

The High Court did not adjudicate the underlying tax dispute on merits. Instead, it restored the matter to the appellate authority for consideration in accordance with law.

The appellate authority will now have to examine the petitioner’s application for condonation of delay and, subject to its satisfaction regarding the existence of reasonable cause, proceed to hear and dispose of the appeal.

The Court accordingly disposed of the writ petition on these terms and closed the connected miscellaneous petitions. No order as to costs was made. 

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