The Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal (GSTAT) has allowed an application seeking urgent and out-of-turn hearing of an appeal against the cancellation of GST registration, observing that procedural requirements should not render effective appellate relief illusory where the taxpayer’s business and livelihood are facing continuing prejudice.

The Bench of Sanjay Kumar Chandhariyavi (Judicial Member) and Sungita Sharma (Technical Member) exempted the appellant, Adhunik Fire Appliances, from awaiting completion of the ordinary scrutiny process for the limited purpose of urgent listing.

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The appellant is a sole proprietorship concern engaged in providing works contract services relating to firefighting and fire-safety equipment. Its GST registration was cancelled with effect from January 3, 2024, under Section 29(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The cancellation was subsequently affirmed by the appellate authority.

According to the appellant, the business constituted its sole source of livelihood. It submitted that the cancellation of registration had prevented it from issuing tax invoices, generating e-way bills, making taxable supplies, collecting or depositing tax and filing GST returns.

The appellant contended that these restrictions had brought the business to a complete standstill and resulted in continuing deprivation of livelihood. It claimed that any further delay in hearing the appeal would cause irreparable and non-compensable prejudice.

The application was supported by an affidavit and asserted that an early hearing would not cause prejudice to the respondents. On the other hand, continued deferment of the appeal would allegedly result in grave and recurring hardship to the appellant.

While deciding the application, the Tribunal examined the procedural framework contained in the GSTAT (Procedure) Rules, 2025, particularly Rules 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 24 and 29.

Rule 10 preserves the inherent powers of the GST Appellate Tribunal to issue orders or directions necessary to meet the ends of justice or prevent abuse of its process.

The Bench noted that Rule 12 expressly recognises urgent matters. Under the provision, an urgent matter filed before noon is ordinarily required to be listed on the following working day if it is complete in all respects. In exceptional cases, a matter filed after noon but before 3 p.m. can also be listed on the following day with specific permission.

The Tribunal placed particular reliance on Rule 13, which empowers it to exempt parties from compliance with procedural requirements where sufficient cause is shown. The provision also authorises the Tribunal to issue directions concerning practice and procedure where such directions are considered just and expedient for rendering substantial justice.

Rule 14 empowers the Tribunal to extend the time fixed under the Rules or by an order for undertaking an act or proceeding. Although the application did not primarily concern an extension of time, the Bench said that the provision reinforced the procedural flexibility incorporated into the Rules to further the cause of justice.

The Bench also referred to Rule 15, under which the Registrar is responsible for registering and scrutinising appeals, petitions and applications. Rule 24 prescribes the process for dealing with defective appeals and applications, including granting time to remove defects and placing unresolved issues before the appropriate Bench.

Rule 29 specifically recognises an application for early hearing as an interlocutory application and requires it to contain the prescribed particulars and be supported by an affidavit.

The Tribunal observed that its power under Rule 13 must be exercised judicially. The requirement of showing “sufficient cause” calls upon the Tribunal to determine whether strict compliance with a procedural requirement would, in the circumstances of a particular case, obstruct rather than advance substantial justice.

Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, the Bench noted that procedure is designed to facilitate justice and should not be interpreted in an excessively technical manner where such an approach could frustrate its very purpose.

The Tribunal also referred to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kailash v. Nanhku, in which it was reiterated that procedural rules are the handmaid of justice. Unless compelled by express statutory language, such provisions should not be interpreted in a manner that leaves a judicial forum helpless in extraordinary circumstances requiring intervention.

According to the GSTAT, procedural law is intended to regulate and assist the administration of substantial and real justice. It should not become an instrument for preventing the adjudication of substantive rights.

The Bench observed that this principle was especially relevant because Rule 13 itself embodies the same approach by expressly authorising procedural exemptions upon sufficient cause being demonstrated.

Applying these principles, the Tribunal found that the appellant was not seeking an early hearing merely for convenience.

The appellant had specifically pleaded that the cancellation of its GST registration had effectively disabled it from carrying on its business and had affected its sole source of livelihood. The prejudice alleged was continuing in nature rather than confined to a past event.

The Bench also took note of the appellant’s contention that a delay in considering the appeal could substantially diminish the practical value of any relief that might ultimately be granted.

The Tribunal acknowledged that scrutiny of appeals, pleadings and supporting documents ordinarily falls within the Registry’s functions under Rule 15. It also recognised that Rule 24 lays down the procedure to be followed where defects are identified.

At the same time, the Bench clarified that the application did not seek exemption from any mandatory requirement under the CGST Act, the Uttar Pradesh GST Act or any other substantive law.

The limited issue before the Tribunal was whether the appellant should be required to wait for the completion of the ordinary scrutiny process before its appeal could be placed before the Bench, despite the urgency arising from the alleged complete stoppage of its business.

Considering the language of Rule 13, the inherent power preserved under Rule 10, the urgent-listing mechanism under Rule 12 and the recognition of early-hearing applications under Rule 29, the Tribunal concluded that sufficient cause had been established.

It consequently held that, in the peculiar circumstances, it would be just and expedient to exempt the appellant from awaiting completion of the ordinary Registry scrutiny before urgent listing.

The Bench noted that the required filing or court fee had been paid and that the application was supported by an affidavit setting out the grounds of urgency.

The Tribunal made it clear that the procedural exemption was confined to urgent listing and would not amount to waiver of any mandatory statutory condition.

Questions relating to limitation, statutory pre-deposit, prescribed fees, maintainability and compliance with other requirements under the CGST or SGST laws were expressly kept open for determination by the appropriate Bench.

The GSTAT also clarified that any substantive defect affecting the maintainability or merits of the appeal could still be examined in accordance with law.

Allowing the urgent-hearing application, the Tribunal directed that it be tagged with the main appeal. The Registry was instructed to take consequential steps and inform the appellant about the date fixed for listing.

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