The Supreme Court has held that Section 12 of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 does not require criminal proceedings in other cases against the accused to remain suspended until the conclusion of proceedings under the Gangsters Act.

The bench of Justice K. V. Viswanathan and Justice Arun Palli clarified that the provision only gives precedence to a Gangsters Act trial in the event of a clash of dates and is not intended to “freeze” other criminal proceedings.

The matter arose from an FIR registered on September 30, 2023, at Talbehat Police Station in Lalitpur district, Uttar Pradesh, following the death of Raghavendra Singh. The FIR invoked Sections 147, 323, 504, 506, 302 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code against nine accused persons, including the first respondent. The allegation was that the deceased had been assaulted with lathis, stones and metal rods, resulting in his death.

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Following investigation, charge sheets were filed in October 2023 against seven accused persons for offences including murder and rioting. The criminal case was committed to the Sessions Court and registered as Sessions Trial No. 934 of 2023.

Subsequently, the police formed the view that the alleged offence had been committed as part of the activities of a constituted gang. A Gang Chart was prepared and forwarded to the competent authorities. On January 1, 2024, a separate FIR was registered under Section 2(b)(i) of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986, against the accused persons.

The proceedings under the Gangsters Act were registered as Gangsters Sessions Trial No. 1 of 2024.

The controversy arose when the accused persons sought to keep the original sessions trial in abeyance on the ground that Section 12 of the Gangsters Act required the Gangsters Act proceedings to take precedence.

By this stage, the murder trial had progressed substantially. Charges had been framed on February 26, 2024, and by January 8, 2025, the prosecution had completed its evidence. The accused were scheduled to have their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The application seeking suspension of the murder trial was filed on January 18, 2025.

The Additional District and Sessions Judge, Lalitpur, rejected the application on March 3, 2025. The trial court relied upon the Supreme Court’s earlier judgment in Dharmendra Kirthal v. State of U.P., reported in (2013) 8 SCC 368, and concluded that Section 12 was not intended to delay other criminal proceedings. It also noted that the Gangsters Act trial had not even commenced when the application was filed.

The trial court specifically found that there was no justification for giving precedence to the Gangsters Act proceedings in circumstances where the ordinary sessions trial was already nearing completion.

The accused challenged the Sessions Court’s order before the Allahabad High Court.

The High Court accepted the contention that the Gangsters Act proceedings were required to take precedence. It consequently directed that Sessions Trial No. 934 of 2023 be kept in abeyance and instructed the Special Judge to expedite Gangsters Sessions Trial No. 1 of 2024.

This order was challenged before the Supreme Court by the de facto complainant.

The central question before the Supreme Court was whether Section 12 of the Gangsters Act required the pending sessions trial for the underlying offences to be suspended merely because proceedings under the Gangsters Act had also been instituted against the same accused persons.

Section 12 of the Gangsters Act provides that a trial under the Act before a Special Court shall have precedence over the trial of any other case against the accused in any other court and that such other trial shall remain in abeyance.

The Supreme Court, however, emphasised that the provision must be understood in light of its legislative purpose and its earlier interpretation in Dharmendra Kirthal.

In Dharmendra Kirthal, the Supreme Court had explained that the purpose of Section 12 was to prevent an accused from being required to face two trials simultaneously and, more importantly, to ensure that proceedings before the Special Court under the Gangsters Act did not get delayed because of clashes in the dates fixed in other trials. The provision was therefore aimed at ensuring speedy trial rather than preventing other criminal proceedings altogether.

The Court also considered the Allahabad High Court’s earlier decision in Mobin Iftikhar Zaidi v. State of U.P., where the legislative intent behind Section 12 had been understood as ensuring that the Gangsters Act trial received preference and was not unduly delayed because of proceedings in other courts.

That interpretation made it clear that Section 12 was not intended to halt trials involving other offences such as murder, dacoity or rape until the Gangsters Act proceedings concluded. Instead, the courts were required to manage the respective proceedings in a manner that ensured the Gangsters Act trial received priority where dates actually conflicted.

The Supreme Court gave a categorical interpretation to the provision, holding that the object of Section 12 was not to freeze other criminal proceedings against an accused.

According to the Court, the statutory purpose is limited to giving priority to proceedings under the Gangsters Act where there is a clash of dates. It does not mean that all other criminal trials automatically have to remain suspended until the Gangsters Act trial reaches its conclusion.

The Court’s interpretation prevents Section 12 from becoming a mechanism through which accused persons could indefinitely postpone trials for substantive offences merely because a parallel Gangsters Act case had been registered.

The Supreme Court further relied on Section 346 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which corresponds to Section 309 of the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure.

Section 346 requires criminal proceedings to continue from day to day until witnesses in attendance have been examined, except where an adjournment beyond the following day is considered necessary for reasons to be recorded. The provision also imposes restrictions on adjournments and requires courts to record reasons in specified circumstances.

The Court held that Section 12 of the Gangsters Act must be read harmoniously with Section 346 of the BNSS. When the two provisions are considered together, the conclusion is that Gangsters Act proceedings receive preference when there is a clash of dates, rather than that other criminal trials must automatically stop.

An important aspect of the judgment is the Supreme Court’s emphasis that the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial under Article 21 is not confined to accused persons.

The Court observed that victims also possess a valuable right to speedy conclusion of criminal proceedings. Inordinate delays can have a serious impact not only on the parties but also on society at large.

The Court warned that accepting the interpretation advanced by the accused could provide a means to delay all other criminal proceedings merely by pointing to the pendency of a Gangsters Act case. Such an approach could create serious difficulties in preserving evidence, securing witnesses and ensuring an effective criminal trial.

Referring to its earlier decision in Rattiram v. State of M.P., the Court reiterated that speedy trial is an important facet of Article 21. It further noted that delay can cause acute suffering to victims and that the benefits of delay cannot be treated as belonging exclusively to the accused.

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court found that the Sessions Court had correctly rejected the application seeking suspension of the murder trial.

The Court noted that by January 8, 2025, the prosecution evidence had already been completed and the recording of the accused’s statements under Section 313 of the Code had been scheduled. The application to suspend the trial was filed only thereafter.

In contrast, the Gangsters Act trial had not even commenced. At the relevant stage, only the charge sheet had been filed. Consequently, there was no question of an actual clash of dates that could trigger the priority contemplated by Section 12.

The Supreme Court held that the Allahabad High Court had therefore erred in reversing the Sessions Court’s decision.

The Supreme Court noted that the High Court itself had recognised that the legislative intention behind Section 12 was not to stop proceedings in other cases and that the provision was designed to address a clash of dates. Despite this, the High Court ultimately directed that the sessions trial be kept in abeyance. The Supreme Court described this as a contradictory and legally untenable conclusion.

The Supreme Court accordingly set aside the Allahabad High Court’s August 25, 2025 order and allowed the appeal.

The Court also recorded that, pursuant to its interim order of April 13, 2026, the Sessions Court had already proceeded with Sessions Trial No. 934 of 2023, concluded the trial and convicted the accused persons.

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