The Delhi High Court has held that constitutional courts cannot routinely direct authorities to consider representations when no statutory provision confers such a right or imposes a corresponding obligation on the authority.
Dismissing a writ petition filed by importers challenging anti-dumping proceedings, the bench of Justice Anil Kshetrapal and Justice Shail Jain ruled that it could not create a legal remedy where the legislature has not provided one and declined to interfere at a stage when the anti-dumping findings were merely recommendatory.
The bench observed that the petition was premature since the Central Government had not yet issued any notification acting upon the final findings of the Directorate General of Trade Remedies (DGTR).
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The petition arose from the DGTR’s final findings dated June 12, 2026, in an anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of Thermoplastic Polyurethane (TPU)-based Surface/Paint Protection Film originating in or exported from China.
The petitioners initially sought multiple reliefs, including quashing the final findings, directing the authorities to independently consider their objections before imposing anti-dumping duty, restraining the government from imposing such duty, and protecting their right to pursue a statutory appeal before CESTAT.
However, at the outset of the hearing, the petitioners confined their challenge to a limited prayer seeking consideration of their representations dated June 19 and June 22, 2026, submitted after the DGTR had issued its final findings.
The Union Government opposed the petition, contending that the petitioners had failed to participate in the anti-dumping investigation despite receiving notice. According to the respondents, the DGTR had invited importers, users and user associations to register as interested parties and submit questionnaire responses within the prescribed time. Despite receiving written intimation, the petitioners neither registered themselves as interested parties nor submitted the required importer or user questionnaire or any supporting material during the investigation.
During the hearing, the petitioners fairly acknowledged that if the Central Government ultimately accepted the DGTR’s recommendations and issued a notification imposing anti-dumping duty, they would have an effective statutory appellate remedy before the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) under Section 9C of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
While considering the request to direct the authorities to examine the petitioners’ representations, the High Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining. The Supreme Court had cautioned constitutional courts against mechanically issuing directions for “consideration” of representations, observing that such orders should not revive stale claims or create legal rights that do not otherwise exist.
The Delhi High Court emphasized that the principle laid down by the Supreme Court extends beyond stale claims. It makes clear that courts cannot compel an authority to decide a representation unless the governing statute requires the authority to do so. A direction to “consider” cannot itself become a source of legal entitlement.
The Bench observed that the DGTR’s final findings were merely recommendatory and had not yet culminated in a notification by the Central Government. Since the petitioners themselves admitted that a statutory appeal would become available once a notification was issued, there was no justification for invoking the High Court’s writ jurisdiction at this intermediate stage.
The Court further held that there was no statutory provision requiring the respondents to consider or decide the petitioners’ post-final findings representations. Consequently, it found no legal basis for directing the authorities to examine those representations.
Concluding that the challenge had been brought before any enforceable cause of action had arisen, the High Court refused to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Holding the writ petition to be premature, it dismissed both the petition and the connected applications.
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