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HomeCompany & PMLAAvailability of Statutory Appeal Not an Absolute Bar to Exercise of Writ...

Availability of Statutory Appeal Not an Absolute Bar to Exercise of Writ Jurisdiction in PMLA Attachment Cases: Delhi High Court

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The Delhi High Court has clarified that while the availability of a statutory appellate remedy under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) is an important consideration, it does not operate as an absolute bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 

The  Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia restored a writ petition challenging a provisional attachment order and directed fresh adjudication by the Single Judge.

The case arose from a challenge to a Provisional Attachment Order (PAO) issued under Section 5 of the PMLA. The bank had approached the High Court contending that the attachment was without jurisdiction, particularly because the property in question had already been mortgaged and was subject to proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002.

Earlier, while entertaining the writ petition, the Single Judge had passed an interim order directing that any decision taken by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 8 of the PMLA would remain subject to the outcome of the writ petition. However, at the final stage, the writ petition was disposed of with liberty to the bank to avail the statutory appellate remedy under Section 26 of the PMLA.

The central issue before the Division Bench was whether, in light of the interim protection granted and the nature of the challenge (including jurisdictional grounds), the writ petition ought to have been decided on merits instead of relegating the petitioner to an alternate remedy.

The Court reiterated settled principles governing writ jurisdiction, emphasizing that the power of judicial review under Article 226 is wide and cannot be curtailed by statute. However, courts must exercise restraint where an equally efficacious statutory remedy is available. The existence of an alternate remedy is a rule of prudence and not a rule of law.

The Bench held that merely because an interim order was granted earlier, it does not compel the writ court to decide the matter on merits in every case. At the same time, the Court noted that where an interim order makes subsequent actions subject to the writ outcome, ordinarily the legality of such actions should be examined.

The Court observed that this principle is not absolute and must be balanced against factors such as the nature of adjudication already undertaken by the statutory authority and the availability of an appellate mechanism. 

A critical aspect highlighted by the Division Bench was that the Single Judge had not elaborated on the reasons for declining to exercise writ jurisdiction. Specifically, there was no clear discussion on the nature of adjudication conducted by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 8 of the PMLA; and why such adjudication warranted relegating the petitioner to the appellate remedy.

This lack of reasoning, according to the Court, justified interference in the intra-court appeal.

Setting aside the Single Judge’s order dated March 17, 2026, the Division Bench restored the writ petition to its original number and directed that it be decided afresh on merits.

The Court also clarified that all issues, including the maintainability of the writ petition and jurisdictional challenges to the attachment, remain open for consideration.

Case Details

Case Title: Bharati Sahakari Bank Ltd. Versus UOI

Citation: JURISHOUR-1069-HC-2026(DEL) 

Case No.: LPA 296/2026, CM APPL. 26820/2026 & CM APPL. 26821/2026

Date: 28.04.2026

Counsel For  Appellant: Avi Singh, Senior Advocate

Counsel For Respondent: Amit Tiwari- CGSC

Read More: Optional ‘Type Test Charges’ Not Includible in Assessable Value for Excise Duty: CESTAT

Mariya Paliwala
Mariya Paliwalahttps://www.jurishour.in/
Mariya is the Senior Editor at Juris Hour. She has 7+ years of experience on covering tax litigation stories from the Supreme Court, High Courts and various tribunals including CESTAT, ITAT, NCLAT, NCLT, etc. Mariya graduated from MLSU Law College, Udaipur (Raj.) with B.A.LL.B. and also holds an LL.M. She started her career as a freelance tax reporter in the leading online legal news companies.

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